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ABSTRACT 
The rationale for conducting any type of testing is ultimately to draw reasonable conclusions about 
the subject based on the results of the test or tests performed. Given a new piece of software, a software 
engineer may wish to determine the software's ability to handle inputs outside its specified domain, the 
software's performance on a given computing platform, or the software's ability to interact with other 
similar pieces of software. The testing performed by software engineers and analysis of the test results 
is the general area known as software testing. 
In this thesis, a newly-proposed structured framework for test suite development is introduced to 
capture the interaction between the applications being tested, to investigate the use of an application's 
invalid input space for the generation of test cases, and to explore the notation that test stiites can be 
expressed on two levels, abstractly and concretely via instantiation. In addition, the proposed structured 
framework is applied to the Minimum Interoperability Specification for Public Key Infrastructtire (PKI) 
Components (MISFC) standard for the development of £in abstract test suite. A part of the abstract test 
suite was instantiated, or implemented, and executed against a reference implementation of an \^IISPC 
specified Certificate Authority (CA) to explore the proposed structured frameworks capabilities. The 
result of this thesis demonstrate the limitation of structured test suite development frameworks that do 
not utilize an application's invalid input space for test case generation and the benefits of being able to 
express test suites at both abstract and concrete levels. In addition, the instantiated test suite revealed 
the MISPC CA reference implementation could not process a few valid MISPC messages and generated 
some invEdid MISPC messages of its own. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
An Overview of Software Testing 
The rationale for conducting any type of testing is ultimately to draw reasonable conclusions about 
the subject based on the results of the test(s) performed. The context of the tGst{s) will determine the 
scope, quality, and validity of the conclusions that can be drawn from the test result (s). For example, 
if the subject to be tested is a newly discovered material, the materials engineer will test the material 
to determine its physicsd properties of interest: corrosiveness, hardness, brittleness, conductivity, etc. 
Given a sample of the new material, the materials engineer may want to know its tensile strength. The 
tensile strength of a material determines its abihty to withstand stress without failure (breaking). The 
materials engineer may perform a series of tensile strength tests and conclude that the new material's 
tensile strength is X, but what does this tensUe strength value really mean? Some context needs to 
be given for the tensile strength vEilue of X in order to determine its scope, quedity and validity. Were 
the test samples drawn from the same lot of the new material? If so, this value may be good only 
for that specific lot of the new material and the way that lot of material was produced. If not, the 
tensile strength value of X may be good for the new material in general. Another element that may 
give context to the tensile strength value are the cUmatic conditions (temperature, pressure, humidity) 
imder which the tests were performed. If the climatic conditions were the same for all tests, then 
the value of X would only be a good value under those specific climatic conditions. If the tests were 
performed under different climatic conditions, then the value of X would hold true over a range of 
climatic conditions. Based on analysis of the test results and their context, the material engineer may 
draw the conclusion that the material's tensile strength of X would be a useful material for constructing 
an airframe's superstructures. Just as new materials can be the subject of test(s), so may new computer 
applications or software. The computer or software engineer tests a piece of software to determine its 
execution and logical properties of interest: utilization of resources, tolerance to errors, interoperability 
with other applications, ftmctionality provided by the application, etc. Given a new piece of software, 
the software engineer may wish to determine the application's ability to handle erroneous input. After 
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a series of tests, the software engineer may determine that the softw£ire handles about half the errors 
that are presented. What is the meaning of this result? What types of erroneous inputs were created? 
How were these inputs presented to the software? What was the configuration of the host system that 
the software was executed on? Once these questions are answered, the result will have some context 
in which it can be viewed. The input may have been a string of random bits or ASCII bytes. The 
input may have been read in from a file or keyed in from the keyboard. The host system may have 
had an 8088 processor with 16KB of RAM running DOS or it could have had a Pentium Pro processor 
with 128M of RAM running Windows 98. The software engineer may draw the conclusion that the 
application may be acceptable for a hobbyist that uses it for recreation, but not for large corporation 
that would use it to conduct multi-million dollar transactions. The testing performed and analysis of 
results by the software engineer is the general subject known as software testing. 
The fundamental limits and theoretical foimdations of software testing need to be understood before 
any type of software test can be designed, implemented, and executed. Ideally, all possible inputs and 
the execution of every statement of the source code would be used to exhaustively test whether or not 
an application performs correctly. The main limitation to the exhaustive testing approach is the time 
required to perform such tests. For example. If am application accepts a string of 10 characters and 
using a very simple character set consisting of just lower case letters, the number of difierent possible 
inputs is 26^° or about 1.4116709 x 10^''. If one input can be tested every 1 nemosecond. that means 
it would take 4.4763792 x 10'® years to perform an exhaustive test of the inputs. To put this figure 
into perspective, the estimated age of the universe is about lO'' years [36]. However even if the time 
limitation of exhaustive tests could be overcome, that still would not guarantee that all errors of the 
application would be revealed [18]. The pseudo-code shown in Figiire 1.1 demonstrates that all the 
statements could be exercised without revealing the error. In the example, there exists a conceptual 
error that adding three numbers together and dividing the result by three wiU guarantee that the 
original numbers were equal. The example demonstrates one of the most fundamental ideas in software 
testing which is that tests only show the presence of errors but not the absence of them [13]. Because 
exhaustive testing is impractical and practical tests only show the presence of errors, a framework to 
quantify the relative power of tests and testing strategies to each other becomes an important topic for 
software testing. In [18], a framework was developed for determining the relative power of tests and 
test strategies after challenging the idea of the use of correctness proofe. The practicality of deriving a 
valid correctness proof is shown to be very difficult, if not impossible, because of the many assumptions 
required. Some of the assumptions required for a valid correctness proof include: the existence of a 
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IF ((X + Y + Z) / 3 = X) 
THEN PRINT ("X, Y, and Z are Equal") 
ELSE PRINT ("X, Y, and Z are Not Equal") 
Figme 1.1 Pseudo-Code Example. 
correct specification, incorporation of the complete nmtime enviroiunent incorporated into the proof, 
and the actual proof derivation must be error free. The proposed framework is based on the deiinitions 
of a test being complete, reliable, and valid. A test is said to be complete, if by successfully passing a 
specific test, one can imply that the tested software contains no errors sought by the test. The ability 
of a test to reveal errors is defined as its reliability while the validity of a test is its ability to produce 
meaningful results. The proposed framework uses these definitions to evaluate a test's capability to 
establish a program's correctness. However, in [24], this proposed framework was proven to be infeasible 
because no computable procedure exists for establishing a program's correctness and a new framework 
is proposed based on determining a test strategy's (particularly the path testing strategy) reliability. 
The idea of correctness proofs is revisited in [17] which tries to simplify the proof by incorporating the 
results of tests, but this framework turns out to be informal and becomes difficult to apply in a more 
general framework. [19] takes a different approach to determining the relative power of tests and test 
strategies by exploring a framework that uses a specification as the basis for evaluating tests. A formal 
proof is provided that shows the set of programs reliably tested using a specification independent test 
is empty. This limitation of specification independent testing demonstrates the need for a specification 
when evEiluating the relative power of tests. 
In general, a test suite is used to perform a test or collection of tests on a computer application 
or a piece of software. The test suite's testing strategy is the method used to select and possibly 
generate the tests and test data to be used to investigate the piece of software [4, 5, 28]. The following 
three testing strategies are generally used in software testing: black-box testing, white-box testing, 
and hybrid testing. The black-box testing strategies are used to derive tests based on the specification 
of the software. The white-box testing strategies are used to derive tests based on the structure of 
the software or the way it is implemented. A hybrid testing strategy uses a combination of both 
black-box and white-box testing strategies. These testing strategies can be combined and applied to 
develop a test suite for a given piece of software. However, the way strategies are utilized and their 
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effectiveness depends on severed factors about the software being tested as well as the objectives of the 
test designer. What is the structure of the software? Is it simply a single stand-alone function or a 
complex collection of modules that interact with each other? What interfaces to the software does the 
tester have access to during the testing? Is it the software's application program interface (API) or 
a graphic user interface (GtJI)? What type of code does the tester have access to when designing the 
tests? Is it the software's source or executable code? What does the test designer want to demonstrate 
about the software? Does the software interoperate with other software? How does the software perform 
under erroneous conditions? These eire a few of the factors that determine the testing strategies chosen 
for the development of £m effective test suite. 
The first step in the development of an effective test suite is to determine the amount of information 
the test suite designer will have about the software being tested. At a minimum, the test designer must 
have information about the desired functional behavior of the software to be tested. However, the test 
designer may have more detailed information such as how the software should be structured. In either 
case, an informal, formal, or hybrid' specification is used to convey this information to the test designer. 
An informal specification uses a natural language, such as English, to describe the desired properties of 
the software while a formal specification uses a more rigorous notation, such as mathematical symbols 
or a specification language (such as Z). Each type of specification has its advantages and disadvantages. 
An informal specification is generally easier to understand but is generally more ambiguous than a 
formal specification. A formal specification is generally less ambiguous than 2m informal specification 
but is more difficult to understand. A formal specification may allow for properties of the software to 
be derived by a mathematical proof which an informal specification cannot achieve. Whatever form a 
specification takes, it is required in the development of a test suite to provide a basis for comparison 
of the software being tested. Without a specification, a specific test suite woxild have no context and 
any results obtained would be meaningless. A formal proof of the need for a specification in software 
testing is presented by Gourlay in [20]. 
The development of a test suite continues by determining what can be tested and how the test can 
be implemented given a specific piece of software. Determining the amount and type of access the test 
sxiite is given to the software to be tested is one important factor. This will determine how much of 
the specification given to the test designer can be verified. If the test designer is not given access to 
the internal structure or source code of the softrware, then no matter what the specification says about 
the structure of the software, it cannot be verified. Not allowing the test designer access to the internal 
^ A hybrid specification consists of both informal and formal specifications. 
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structure or source code of the software forces the designer to develop a test suite based on functional or 
black-box testing strategies [4, 5, 28]. However, if permission is given to the test designer to eiccess the 
internal structure or source code of the software, then the test designer can use the extra information to 
develop a test suite based on structural or white-box testing strategies. This additional access allows 
white-box tests to determine more precisely how much of the software's source code is exercised as 
compared to black-box tests. After a level of access has been determined, the test designer can then 
evaluate how testable the software is based on what can be observed and controlled by a test suite [16]. 
The software must provide at least one mechanism for the test suite to observe or gather information 
about its behavior and output, otherwise no data can be collected for analysis. Likewise, the software 
must provide the test suite the ability to control or stimulate it to produce an observable behavior. The 
observe-ability and control-ability of the software will affect what the test suite will be able to test, 
how the test is performed, and the effectiveness and quality of the test. 
Once a specification and the testability of the software have been evaluated, the test designer can 
begin to develop objectives that a specific test suite will be able to realize which are in line with his 
own or his employer's motives, goals, and perspectives. Test suites can be classified into three non-
mutually excliisive groups based on the objectives and goals of the test designer. Conformance or 
requirements testing determines a software application's ability to provide specific functionalities or 
behaviors that are defined by a specification. In addition, the specification may also dictate how the 
software should implement the specified functionedities or behaviors. A test designer who works for 
a company that certifies that vendor applications follow a given specification is motivated to design 
effective conformance tests, so that the company's reputation of quality evaluations is maintained. 
Assurance or reliability testing determines the confidence a user can have about the operation of the 
application software under normal and adverse conditions. A test designer who works for an application 
vendor is motivated to design assurance tests, so the company's reputation of delivering qualit}' software 
applications is maintained. An assurance test suite should, at a minimum, ensure that the application 
provides all the functionality or behaviors claimed, operates without errors or failure when executed 
by a user under both normal and abnormal operating conditions, and interfaces with other software 
as required. Finally, interoperability testing evaluates an applications ability to interact with other 
software to produce meaningful behaviors. For interoperability testing to be useful, there must exist 
some relationship between the applications that interact with each other. A test designer who works for 
a company that produces an e-mail server is motivated to design interoperability tests that demonstrate 
its server's ability to interact with e-mail clients developed by many different vendors, so the company's 
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reputation of providing softweire compatibility is strengthened. 
One of the final aspects the test designer must consider is how the test suite will be implemented. 
The implementation of a test suite will ultimately determine the scope of what can be tested and the 
value of the test results. One question to be answered is how the test suite will exercise an application 
to be tested. In general, static or dynamic testing techniques are used to exercise the software applica­
tion. Static testing techniques are applied to an applications source code without actually executing it. 
Static testing is an effective technique when the level of access to an application allows for structural 
or white-box test suite development. However, static testing is not effective when the level of access to 
an application only provides for the functional or black-box test suite development. Dynamic testing 
techniques allow a test suite to actually execute the application while it is being tested. Dynamic testing 
techniques £ire the way to test an application when the test suite is developed from black-box testing 
strategics. If the appropriate level of access to an application is granted, then both static and dynamic 
testing techniques can be used when implementing a test suite. Another important implementation 
question to be answered is how the test suite and application to be tested will be configured relative to 
each other. In Figiu-e 1.2, three ways of configuring an application to be tested, or the Implementation 
Under Test (lUT), and a test suite arc shown. Figure 1.2(a) shows a test suite designed to inter­
act only with the high level (user) interfaces of the implementation under test (lUT) and a reference 
implementation. This configuration simulates users of the IL^T as well as the users of the reference 
implementation and assumes that both the component connectivity and reference implementation are 
properly implemented. If the lUT is implemented correctly, it should be able to interact with the refer­
ence implementation which demonstrates the configuration's effectiveness for interoperabiht>- test suites 
[22]. The configuration shown in Figure 1.2(b) eliminates the presence of a reference implementation. 
In this configuration, the test suite once again interacts with the high level (user) interfaces of the lUT, 
but directly interacts with the component coimectivity. This configuration simulates the users of the 
rUT as well as a complete reference implementation and assumes that only the component connectivity 
is properly implemented. In the final configuration shown in Figure 1.2(c). all extra implementation 
assumptions are removed by eliminating reliance on both a reference implementation and component 
connectivity. In this configuration, the test suite again interacts with the high level (user) interfaces 
of the lUr, but also its low level (system) interfaces. This last configuration may not be good for 
interoperabihty test suites but may be adequate for conformance test suites. After the configuration of 
the test suite and lUT is determined, the test designer has some knowledge about how the test suite 
and lUT will interact with each other. Now, the test designer must determine how the test suite will 
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(c) Upp«r tnd Lower Livel intarfice Configuration 
Figiire 1.2 Test Suite Configurations. 
generate test cases (data) and evaluate the results of the lUT's behavior. Different techniques with 
varying degrees of effectiveness are used in the generation of test cases to stimulate an appUcation to 
produce an expected behavior. The test cases along with their mapping to the expected behavior of 
the application can be housed in em oracle that can be tised by the test suite to compare an applica­
tion's actual versus expected behavior. The topic of test case generation will be explored more fully 
throughout the rest of this thesis. 
The Structured Development of Test Suites 
The structured development of a test suite simply put is the development of a test or set of tests using 
various testing strategies and techniques in an org£inized or structured fashion. The way the various 
testing strategies and techniques are organized provides a structured ftamework for the development of 
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a test suite. In addition to organization, a structured framework gives the test designer a perspective on 
how the different testing strategies and techniques relate to cach other and the effect they have on the 
development of the test suite. In general, every test suite developed requires some level of organization 
and structure, so that its results will have meaning. However, the level of orgemization £ind structure 
varies between different test suites in the absence of a consistent structured framework. Also, the level of 
organization and structure varies due to the lack of a framework that unifies different testing strategies 
and the effectiveness of different test design techniques. A structured framework provides a way to 
consistently unify the different testing strategies under a single design technique. 
Structured test suite development research has mainly been in the form of frameworks used in the 
derivation of test data for test suites. The research has focused on specification based frauneworks 
because of the results in [19, 20] which validate the use of specifications in test suite development. 
Specification based frameworks use the specification of an application when deriving test data for the 
test suite [3]. Specification based frameworks have the advantage of deriving test data for a test suite 
independent of the way an application is implemented which is useful when a specific implementation 
of an application is not available. However, when a specific implementation of an application is avail­
able, the specification based framework has the drawback of not easily integrating test data derived 
from the specific implementation into the framework. For example, a specification may state that vari­
able X can have any integer value, but a specific implementation may have a maximtim limit on the 
value for variable X. As a resvilt. a structured framework should integrate the use of both specifica­
tion based frameworks as well as non-specification based frameworks when possible. Non-specification 
based frameworks derive test data based on the way an application is implemented. Investigation of 
specification based frameworks is useful because many times test suites for an application as well as 
the application itself arc developed in parallel and a test suite designer does not have access to specifics 
about an application's final implementation. 
Specification based structured framework research has foctised on the use of formal specifications 
which can be divided into either algebraic or model based specifications. Algebraic based specifications 
describe applications in terms of an application's operations while model based specifications use states 
and state transitions to describe an application. The research using algebraic specification has been 
driven by protocol testing, specifically, trace analysis and has been extensively investigated in contrast 
to the research using model based specifications [39]. Model based specification research has focused 
on test strategies called partition testing which divide the domain (or input space) of an application 
into equivalent domains. The set of inputs that can stimulate an application to produce the same 
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reaction or result creates an equivalent domsiin. In partition testing, if one element of an equivalent 
domain results in the application passing a specific test, it is expected (perhaps incorrectly) that all 
elements within the equivalent domain will allow the appHcation to pass the test. The partition testing 
research using model based specifications can be grouped based on the technique used to define the 
specification, such as Z or Vieima Development Method (VDM). In 1988, Hall used the predicates of 
Z specification operations to create simple partitions of the input space [21 J. In another study that 
used a VDM specification, Dick and Faivre reduced an input expression into a disjunctive normal form 
(DNF) to partition an input space by the disjunctions [14]. These and other important works explore 
how to apply partition testing techniques in a structured framework, but did not result in a unifying 
framework for expressing the relationship of the partitioning sub-strategies. To address the lack of a 
unifying framework. Stocks proposed the Test Template Framework in [39] to fill this void. 
The Test Template Framework: An Example of a Specification-Based Frame­
work for Structured Test Suite Development 
The Test Template Framework (TTF) was introduced to provide a structured framework for test 
suite development using model based specifications [39. 38]. The application of TTF is independent of 
the model based specification and of the testing strategies applied. TTF requires that a valid input 
space (VIS) be specified which is usually obtained directly from the specification. After a VIS has 
been defined, testing strategies (TS) are systematically applied to partition the VIS. A Test Template 
Hierarchy (TTH) is created using a function that maps the VIS and a given testing strategy to a set 
of test  templates (TT).  The TTH generation function can be expressed as TTH : PVIS XTS —* TT. 
The PVIS is the power set of the VIS and is used because the TTH function can operate on any subset 
of the VIS to allow for recursive application of the operation. TS is the set of possible testing strategies. 
Because the TTH function further partitions the PVIS, TT is the power set of PVIS (TT=P(PVIS)) 
which allows the expression to be rewritten as TTH : PVIS x TS —• P[PVIS). 
For example, TTH(VTS, abc) will take the VIS and partition it into a set of test templates based on 
the abc testing strategy. Let's say the abc testing strategy results in partitioning the VIS into VISJ'l, 
VIS_P2, and VIS_P3. The TTH function can be applied to one of the sub-partitions using a different 
testing strategy to create further partitions. For example, TTH(VISJP2, xyz) results in VIS_P2 being 
partitioned into VIS_P2_S1 and VIS_P2JS2 using the xyz testing strategy. A graphical representation 
of the resulting TTH is shown in Figure 1.3. The resulting abstract test templates are the leaves of the 
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Figure 1.3 Test Template Hierarchy Example. 
graph which can be used to generate test data for the particular partition. Properties (such as coverage, 
partition validity, partition equivalence, etc.) of the test templates can be analyzed under a structured 
framework. In addition, the effectiveness of the testing strategies can be compared under a common 
structured framework. The jmaiysis of test template properties and their relative effectiveness will not 
be explored further in this project because the usage of the framework is most relevant at this point in 
the project. 
A more concrete example will now be presented to demonstrate the application of TTF to a spec­
ification in order to derive instances of test data for the test suites. Our example will be a modified 
and shortened version of an example presented in [39]. A program is to take three natural numbers as 
inputs and deterroine if these values can be the lengths of the sides of a triangle. If the values can be 
the lengths of the sides of a triangle, the program should determine what type of triangle it could be: 
equilateral, isosceles (but not equilateral), or scalene (but not isosceles). The following function is used 
to specify the desired program behavior: 
triangle{x, y , z )  =  i  
EQ 'd{ x < y  +  z A y < x  +  z A z < x  +  y ) A { x  =  z A x = y A x ^ O )  
ISO ) £ { x < y  +  z A y < x  +  z A 2 < x  +  y ) A [ { x j ^ 0 A y  =  z A x ^  y ) V  
{ y ^ O A x  =  z A y j ^ z ) V { z ^ O A x  =  y A z ^ x ) ]  
S C A  ' d { x < y  +  z A y < x  +  z A z < x + y ) A { x ^ y A y ^ z A z = ^ x )  
INVALID if -i(x < y  +  z A y < x  +  z A z < x - \ - y )  
where x, y, and z are natural numbers 
In the function, the binary operations of AND, OR, and NOT are represented using A, V, and 
respectively. The domain of triangle() or its VIS as defined in the where clause of the fimction definition 
is the natTiral numbers, N. A function which generates the domain of a function, f(), is now^ defined as 
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dom(f) eind will be useful later in this discussion. To generate a first partitioning of dom(triangle), a 
testing strategy needs to be selected. For this example, let's begin by using a cause-effcct (CE) testing 
strategy to derive the first partitioning of the hierarchy. The cause-effect testing strategy maps effects 
(outputs) to causes (inputs). First, all specified outputs are determined, then the sub-domain of the 
VIS which causes a specific output is determined. We can now use dom(triangle), Ananj/ei and the 
cause-effect strategy as parsuneters to the TTH generation operator: TTH(Dtrtong/etCause-effect). From 
the function definition, the specified outputs are the abstract values representing invalid (INVALID), 
a scalene triangle (SCA), an isosceles triangle (ISO), and an equilateral triangle (EQ). The effects are 
caused by the if clauses in the function definition which determine which inputs (the (x,y,z) triples) 
will generate the given output. The original function triangle() is now respecified as four independent 
functions based on the causes generated by the input domains. 
triangle EQ{X., y ,  z )  =  j  EQ where  (x< i / - l -2Ai /< i  +  2Ar<x  +  j / )A(x  =  2Ax=i /Ax7^0)  
Now, the domains of the four functions are extracted: CEEQ = dom{triangleEQ)nCEiso = 
dom{triangle[so)I CESCA = dom[trianglescA)I and CEISVALID = dom(triangleiNVALID)- These 
represent the first level test templates of the TTH. This is represented by the following expression: 
TTH(I?tHons/e> caxise-^'efX)={CEBQ',CEiso-.CEscA^CEiNVAUD}- Figure 1.4 shows a graphical 
representation of the resulting test template hierarchy. Another application of the TTH generating 
operation will be done on the CEiso test template using a different testing strategy to demonstrate 
how one can further partition the VIS. This time we will use the disjimctive normal form (DNF) parti­
tioning. DNF is used to reduce a statement into a combination of disjoint statements. For example, the 
triangle I so (.x,y,z) ISO where  ( x<y  +  2A( /<x  +  cAr<x  +  2/ ) ' ^ [ (^7^0A2/  =  2Ax^  2/ )V 
( y#0Ax=2Ayj6 r )v (2 f40Ax =  t /A25^x) ]  
triangle sca{^i 2/t  2) = |  SCA where {x<y-\-z / \ y < x - \ - z / \ z < x - ' r y ) f ^ { x i : y / \ y ^ z f \ z ^ x )  
trianglerNVALroix, y,z) = i INVALID where  - " (x  <y - | -2Ai /<n-2A2<x  +  y)  
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Figure 1.4 Triangle Test Template Hierarchy. 
DNF of (a V 6) A c would be (a A c) V (6 A c). As the example demonstrates, the Boolean OR operation 
is used to concatenate the disjoint statements. Applying the DNF partitioning to CEiso results in the 
following three test templates. 
Represented by TTH{CEisoiDNF) — {DNFtso.iiDNFiso.2, DNFiso.2\, this results in the 
second level test templates of the TTH. This process of refinement can continue using different test­
ing strategies until the desired level of refinement is reached. The abstract test hierarchy gener­
ated using the framework provides descriptions of test suites and the nodes of the hierarchy can 
be used to provide a specific set of test data. For example, a test suite used to test the isosce­
les triangle part of the function (program) would be composed of at least three test cases based on 
DNFiso.i,DNF[so.2< and DNFiso.3- Example test data from each test template are (2,4,4), (6,1,6), 
and (5,5,4) for DNFtso.i,DNFiso.2, and DNFrso.z^ respectively. To test the equilateral part of the 
fiinctlon, test data would be generated based on CEEQ such as (1,1,1), (4,4,4) or (5,5,5). The test data 
generated by the TTF can be used in the development and implementation of a specific test suite. 
DNFiso.i = [CEisoUx ^  0) A (y = 2) A (i y)] 
DNFrso.2 = {CE[so\{y # 0) A (x = c) A (y z)] 
DXFiso.-^ = [Cf:,5o|(- 0) A (x = y) A {z ^ x)] 
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Thesis Overview and Contributions 
In this thesis, a new structured framework for test suite development will be introduced that builds 
on previous research in test suite development, specifically the TTF. The new structured framework 
reedizes that a practical structured framework should be able to translate abstract test specifications 
into an implementable test suite with minimal loss of information. The new structured framework will 
follow the TTF by focusing on the use of partition testing techniques of an application's input space. 
The TTF and the other structured frameworks have focused on deriving sets of input test data from 
an application's specification but do not investigate issues that arise when using the set of input test 
data for a specific implementation of a test suite. For example, some test data may not be suitable for 
used by a test suite given the limitations of a specific implementation of an application to be tested. 
In addition, an application's interactions with other applications are not easily expressed with the 
TTF and other structured frameworks. The inability of these structured frameworks to easily capture 
interactions between applications has become very important as client-server applications propagate as 
more computers become networked together. 
The structured framework will be applied to the Minimum Interoperability Specification For Public 
Key Infrastructure Components (MISPC) specification to develop and implement a test suite for a 
reference implementation of the MISPC in order to provide a worked example of the application of the 
new framework. The MISPC is a hybrid specification using natural language to describe component 
interaction while Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.l) is used to describe data structures. The 
structured framework will be applied assuming that only black-box testing techniques can be used to test 
the components of the MISPC reference implementation. Because of the design of the MISPC reference 
implementation components, the test suite configuration will be a modified version of Figure 1.2(a). The 
modification to the original configiiration is that the test suite to be developed will only interact with 
the rUT, the MISPC reference implementation components. To begin the development of a test suite 
for the MISPC, the TTF will be applied to the ASN.l data structures defined by the MISPC. However, 
the MISPC's component interactions are qviickly shown not to be easily expressed with the TTF. In 
addition, the fact that the TTF is applied to a '^alid" input space of an application places limitations 
on the objectives a test suite developed imder the TTF can achieve. A new structured framework is 
proposed, based on the concepts and ideas of the TTF, to resolve the drawbacks of the TTF and to 
translate an abstract test suite description into an specific implementation of a test smte. The new 
structured framework is used to complete the development of a test suite for MISPC components for 
this project. 
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The remaining chapters in the thesis are organized as follows; 
Chapter 2. Overview of the Minimum Interoperable Specification For Public Key Infrastructure 
Components. This chapter gives a general introduction to public key infrastructures (PKIs) and presents 
a detailed description of the Minimum Interoperable Specification for Public Key Infrastructure Com­
ponents for use by this thesis. 
Chapter 3. Test Suite Development For The MISPC. This chapter demonstrates the use of the 
TTF for the development of a test suite for the MISPC and the TTF's limitations. A new structured 
framework for test suite development is proposed to overcome the TTF's limitations and is applied to 
MISPC. 
Chapter 4. Application Of The Proposed Framework To The MISPC. This chapter presents a general 
overview of the MISPC reference implementation and how a test suite is developed and implemented 
for a MISPC Certificate Authority (CA) using the new structured frjimework. In addition, the results 
of executing the test suite on the MISPC CA reference implementation are presented. 
Chapter 5 Conclusions And Future Work. This chapter highlights the advantages of using the new-
structured framework for test suite development and presents areas of the new structured framework 
that needs to be investigated further. 
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2 OVERVIEW OP THE MINIMUM INTEROPERABILITY 
SPECIFICATION FOR PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE 
COMPONENTS 
Public Key Infrastructure and the Minimum Interoperability Specification 
for Public Key Infrastructure Components 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is the general term used to describe the distribution environment 
of public key information of a public key cryptographic system. A public key cryptographic system is 
a cryptographic system where one key is used to encipher information and another is used to decipher 
information. One of the keys must be keep secret and is known as a private key while the other key 
can be distributed to anyone and is known as a public key. Within a PKI, a data structure called a 
certificate is used to bind a specific identity to specific public key information. A Certificate Authority 
(CA) is a tnisted entity that issues emd revokes certificates within a PKI. An Organizational Registration 
Authority (ORA) is an entity trusted by a CA that performs identity and public key verification that 
relieves the CA of this function. A certificate holder (CH) and Clients are entities that use certificates 
issued by CAs they trust (directly or indirectly) to perform cryptographic operations. 
The Minimum Interoperability Specification For Public Key Infrastructure Components (MISPC) ^  
specifies components of a PKI which should be interoperable with other components which meet the 
requirements of the specification regardless of implementation details. The specification defines four 
components by their fimctionality and the data structures (certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists 
(CRLs), and PKI transaction messages) transferred between the components. In the specification, one 
component known as a repository (REP), used to store certificates and CRLs, is referenced but is 
beyond the scope of the specification to be completely described. The specification does not address 
some implementation issues such as the transport mechanism used to transfer information between 
components, error recovery mechanisms, decision algorithms (except for the path validation engine 
^The MISPC version 1 does not include support for repositories and confidentiality. However, these features are being 
investigated and may be incorporated into subsequent versions of the MISPC. 
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(PVE) described later), and out-of-band transactions. 
The MISPC is designed to support both hierarchical and networked trust models as shown in 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2, respectively. In a hierarchical trust model, tnist is developed by a CA certifying 
subordinate C As which implies the existence of root CA that is trusted by all nodes of the infrastructure 
[7]. In Figure 2.1, the top-most CA is the root CA which issues certificates (indicated by a single-headed 
arrow) to subordinate CAs that may in turn issue certificates to other CAs or CHs. All subordinate CAs 
and CHs must trust the root CA because all trust developed within the infrastructure originates and 
relies on the notion that the root CA can be trusted without question. Without this, no trust can be 
developed within the hierarchical trust model. The network trust model develops trust by certification 
between CAs in a peer relationship that removes the notion of a root CA trusted by all entities within 
the infrastructure. In Figure 2.2, the two CAs on the right trust each other as a result of their cross 
certification (indicated by double-headed arrow) of one another. The same situation exists with the 
two CAs on the left. The result is that two independent domains of trust have been developed without 
the need for every entity in the domains placing their trust in a root CA. Because both the hierarchical 
cind networked trust models are supported by the MISPC, a hybrid trust model could be constructed 
if desired. 
CA 
CA CA 
CH 
CH 
CH 
CH 
Figure 2.1 Hierarchical Trust Model. 
The MISPC uses the natural language English to specify the fimctionality required (and some which 
are optional) by each component while using a formsd description technique, ASN.l, to describe the 
data structures of certificates, CRLs, and PKI transaction messages. This subsection will review all the 
basic MISPC components zind the transactions (required and optional) used by each. In addition, the 
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Figure 2.2 Networked TVust Model. 
crjrptographic systems. Path Validation Engine (PVE), and data structures for the certificates, CRLs, 
and PKI messages used by the basic components of the MISPC will be presented. 
MISPC Components: Client, Certificate Holder, Certification Authority, and 
Organizationzd Registration Authority 
The most basic MISPC component is the Client which performs the functions of (a) retrieving cer­
tificates and CRLs from repositories, (b) validating certification paths using the PVE, and (c) verifying 
signatures in certificates and CRLs. Certificates and CRLs are retrieved by the Client from reposi­
tories using the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) version 2, [41]. LDAP is a directory 
service protocol which operates over the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and is based on X.500. 
It contains a subset of the X.500 directory service operations (search, add, delete, modify, bind, un­
bind, abandon) and uses X.500's naming convention [27, 25]. LDAP uses ASN.l to describe its data 
structures which are encoded using the Basic Encoding Rules^ (BER). The use of LDAP is a minimal 
requirement which means that other directory service protocols Ccin be used by a Client, however LDAP 
must be present in any MISPC compliant Client application. Certificates are identified by the certifi­
cate's subject name or a serial nimiber/issuer identification pair. The certificate's subject name is an 
X.500 distinguished neime used to identify the owner of the certificate. CRLs are retrieved based on the 
CA that issued them or by a serial number used to identify a specific CRL. The Client uses the PVE 
to validate a certification path when it does not directly trust a component that generates a signature 
using a certificate issued by a CA the Client does not trust. The Client will try to validate a path from 
the certificate in question to a certificate issued by a CA that it trusts. Details of the PVE operation as 
well as the specific procedure used to verify signatures of certificates and CRLs wiU be reviewed later 
in this section. 
^The MISPC states that components must use Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER), a subset of BE31, for the encoding 
of ASN.l elements. 
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The Certificate Holder (CH) role adds to the capabilities of the basic Client role by allowing an entity 
to perform functions required for the maintenance of certificates. In addition to the Client functions, 
a CH can perform the following four functions: (a) generate signatures, (b) request certificates, (c) 
revoke certificates, and (d) renew certificates. The CH can only perform these certificate maintenance 
functions on certificates for which it is the owner (subject). A certificate cein be requested by either 
of two different transactions: (a) ORA-Generated Registration or (b) Self Registration. In an ORA-
Cenerated Registration transaction, the CH must interact with an ORA to request a certificate while a 
Self Registration transaction allows the CH to request a certificate directly from a CA. The details of 
a CA and ORA are given in the following two paragraphs, respectively. The revocation and renewal of 
certificates are done using the Certificate Revocation and Certificate Renewal transactions, respectively. 
Both transactions require the CH to interact with the CA directly. Finally, all of the information used 
in the CH's transactions needs to be authenticated to prove the origins of the data transmitted during 
the transactions. The authentication is done using signatiires which means that a CH must be able to 
generate signatures as well as verify them. The specific procedure used to generate signatures will be 
discussed when cryptographic systems are reviewed later in this section. 
The Certificate Authority (CA) role adds to the capabilities of the CH role by allowing an entity to 
perform functions required to manage certificates that it has issued to different PKI components. The 
CA has the functionality to (a) issue certificates, (b) revoke certificates, and (c) distribute information 
about certificates. The CA can only perform these certificate management functions on certificates 
which it has issued. CAs issue certificates by accepting ORA-Generated Registration or Self Regis­
tration requests from ORAs or CHs. The CA can revoke a certificate upon receiving a Certificate 
Revocation request from a CH or ORA which has the required authorization. Additionally, the CA 
can renew a certificate by accepting a Certificate Renewal request from the subject of the certificate to 
be renewed. The CA will process the different certificate management requests and will issue, revoke, 
or renew a certificate when appropriate and generate a reply about the status of the request to the 
originating component. A CA distributes information about certificates which it has issued using the 
Post Certificate eind Post CRL transactions. The Post Certificate and Post CRL transactions require 
the CA and repository to interact; however, this interaction is not specified by the MISPC. A CA is 
only required to post certificates it has issued to other CAs but is not prevented from posting other 
types of certificates. A CA periodicsdly uses the Post CRL transaction to distribute information about 
certificates it has revoked. 
The Organizational Registration Authority (ORA) role extends a CH's capabilities by allowing it to 
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vouch for the identity of an entity by signing certificate requests on behalf of the entity or by providing 
information used to authenticate the entity to a CA. An ORA assists an entity in obtaining a certificate 
by using the ORA-Generated Registration transaction. The ORA accepts certificate requests from 
entities and, when appropriate, signs the requests using its private key. The ORA then forwards the 
signed requests to a CA to be processed. In addition, the ORA passes information required to verify 
a certificate's authenticity to the requesting entity, usually the issuing CA's public key. The ORA 
helps in the Self Registration transaction by providing secret information to em entity which is used to 
authenticate the entity to the CA. The interaction between the ORA and the entity wishing to obtain 
a certificate is beyond the scope of the MISPC but must exist. However, the ORA interaction with 
the CA is specified by the MISPC. An ORA can request revocation of certificates using the Certificate 
Revocation transaction on behalf of an entity's organization (company, university, agency, etc.) or for 
an entity which no longer possesses its private key. 
Transactions Specified by the MISPC 
The MISPC describes nine transactions which Clients, CHs, CAs, ORAs, and REPs participate 
in when appropriate. Table 2.1 provides a listing of these transactions, which have been mentioned 
during the component descriptions. The table divides each transaction into functions based on the 
component's role in the transaction. The table shows that a given MISPC component may be required 
to be able to perform more than one role for a given transaction. For example, in the ORA Generated 
Registration transaction, a CA must be able to perform the CA's role of accepting certificate requests 
and issuing certificates as well as the CH's role of generating certificate requests. The CA is required to 
be able to perform the CH's role in ordc- fn •"tificates from other CAs for itself. The table also 
reflects the MISPC's ambiguity about which components must be able to participate in PKCS#10 Self 
Registration transactions. The PKCS#10 Self Registration transaction is basically the same as the Self 
Registration transaction with similar information presented in a different format. The PKCS#10 Self 
Registration transaction message profiles are included later for completeness but will not be expanded 
upon because of the MISPC's simbiguity and its similarity to the Self Registration transaction. 
When a CH wishes to obtain an initial certificate, it can use either the Self Registration or ORA Gen­
erated Registration transaction. From Table 2.1, CH components are required to be able to participate 
in ORA Generated Registration transactions. However, participating in Self Registration transactions 
is optional. Both transactions involve the participation of a CH, a CA, and Ein ORA. An initial Out-
Of-Band (OOB) transaction between the CH and ORA is required by both transactions. The OOB 
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Table 2.1 MISPC Transaction to Component Relationship. 
Transaction Roles Components 
CA ORA CH CL 
ORA Generated Registration CA M 
ORA M 
CH M M M 
Certificate Revocation CA M 
ORA M 
CH M M M 
Self Registration CA M 
CH 0 0 O 
Certificate Renewal CA M 
CH 0 0 O 
Post Certificate CA M 
REP 
Post CRL 
. . . . .  J  
CA M 
REP 
Retrieve Certificate CL M M M M 
REP 
Retrieve CRL CL M M m M 
REP 
PKCS#10 Self Registration CA - 1 A 1 
r- - t 
CH A 1 A 
Key; OA Certificate Authority 
ORA Organization Registration Authority 
CH Certificate Holder 
CL Client 
REP Repository 
CRL Certificate Revocation List 
M Mjindatory 
O Optional 
A Ambiguous 
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transactions are used to exchange any (public and/or secret) key information about the issuing CA as 
well as any extra information that may be required by a CH to authenticate itself to the issuing CA. 
The details of the OOB transactions are beyond the scope of the MISPC, but must convey at least the 
aforementioned information. Once the initial OOB transaction occurs, the Self Registration transaction 
consists of two steps: (1) a certificate request sent to a CA by the CH and (2) a certificate reply sent 
back to the requesting CH by the CA. The certificate request contains information (public key, pre­
ferred subject name, etc.) about the certificate which the CH wishes to obtain as well as information 
(signature, sheured secret, etc.) to authenticate itself to the CA. The certificate reply will either contain 
the certificate or an error code indicating why the CA was unable to issue the certificate. A listing of 
the possible error codes and their meaning is shown in Table 2.2. The certificate reply includes the 
CA's digital signature or some other information (such as a nonce) to authenticate itself to the CH. 
Table 2.2 MSPC Error Codes and Meanings. 
Error Code Definition 
badAlg Cannot validate signature because algorithm 
identifier is unrecognized or unsupported. 
bad^IessageCheck Protection field checked but did not match expected value. 
badPoP Proof-of-Possession field checked but did not match expected value. 
badRcquest The responder does not permit or support transaction. 
badTime The time field in the message header was not 
sufficiently close to the responder's system time. 
badCertId No certificate could be found matching the non-zero serial field. 
After the initial OOB transaction, the ORA Generated Registration transaction consists of two 
steps: (1) a certificate request is sent by the ORA to a CA on behalf of the CH and (2) a certificate 
reply is sent back by the CA to the ORA which submitted the certificate request and optionally to 
the subject of that requested certificate. Once the ORA is satisfied about the requesting CH's identity 
through the initial OOB transaction, it accepts the presented certificate request, signs the request, and 
forwards the request to a CA. The certificate request contains similar information to that which is used 
in the certificate request of the Self Registration transaction. If the CA does not issue a certificate, 
it sends back a certificate reply to the ORA which submitted the certificate request. The certificate 
reply contains the reason a certificate could not be issued, the CA's signature, and other identification 
and authentication information (such as transaction request number). If the CA issues a certificate, it 
sends a certificate reply back to the ORA containing the new certificate, the CA's signature, and other 
identification and authentication information (such as a nonce). In either case, the CA may optionally 
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send the same certificate reply to the subject of the certificate request. 
The Certificate Revocation transaction is used to make a specific certificate invalid before its natural 
period of validity elapses. A component (CA, ORA, or CH) may wish to immediately invalidate a 
certificate which it discovers has been compromised or which is associated with a component that it 
no longer trusts. A CH may request that certificates it owns to be revoked. For example, a CH may 
have been issued a certificate which it no longer requires but will be valid for a period of time. The 
CH may wish to revoke the certificate inunediately in order to reduce the risk of the certificate being 
used inappropriately and itself being held liable. ORAs may request that certificates be revoked on 
behalf of a CH or CH's organization. For example, an ORA may be required by its orgemization to 
revoke all current certificates of CHs which are no longer associated with the organization. The CH or 
ORA sends a revocation request to a CA including information about the certificate to be revoked and 
the reason for its revocation. The revocation request is signed using either the CH's or ORA's private 
key depending on who creates the revocation request. A CA sends a revocation reply back to the 
component that created the revocation request indicating whether or not the certificate was revoked. 
If the certificate is not revoked, em error code is returned indicating the reason for the failure. The 
revocation reply includes the CA's signature and other identification and authentication information 
(such as a nonce). 
The Certificate Renewal transaction is used by a CH which currently possesses a valid certificate 
whose validity period is about to elapse and which wishes to obtJiin a new certificate. The CH interacts 
directly with the C A that issued the certificate to request that a new certificate be issued. The Certificate 
Renewal transaction is a two step renewal process where (1) the CH sends a renewal request to the 
issuing CA and (2) the CA sends a reply back to the CH. The renewal request contains information 
about the new certificate to be issued by the CA and is similar to the certificate request of the Self 
Registration transaction. If the CA issues a certificate, it sends back a reply to the CH containing the 
new certificate. Otherwise, the CA sends back a reply indicating why the CA was unable to issue a new 
certificate. The renewal reply includes the CA's signature and some identification and authentication 
information (transaction number, nonce, etc.) to allow the CA to authenticate itself to the requesting 
CH. 
The Post Certificate/CRL and Retrieve Certificate/CRL transactions are beyond the scope of the 
MISPC due to the fact that they require participation with a repository which is not a completely 
specified component. However, all specified MISPC components (Clients, CHs, CAs, and ORAs) are 
required to be able to retrieve certificates and CRLs &om repositories because they are specified to 
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include the Client functionality (see the previous description of Client component). The posting of 
certificates and CRLs is the responsibility of the CAs (see the previous description of CA component). 
However, the MISPC gives no guidance for the Post Certificate/CRL transactions beyond stating that 
the functionality must exist and CA and cross certificates as well as CRLs issued by a CA must be 
posted to a repository. 
MISPC Cryptographic Systems 
The MISPC specifies two classes of cryptographic algorithms: (1) digital signature algorithms suid 
(2) message authentication codes (MACs). Digital signature algorithms are used by components to sign 
information. There Me several ways of creating a digital signature but in general they are generated 
using a two step process: (1) creation of a message digest using a one-way hash function and (2) the 
encryption of the message digest with the signer's private key using a cryptographic algorithm. A 
one-way hash function is used to create a short string of bits (a message digest) used to fingerprint 
a large amount of information. A one-way hash function has the property of being one-way and may 
demonstrate the desirable characteristic of being collision-free. The one-way property means that, 
given a specific output of the hash fimction, it is diffictilt to determine an input that would create 
the same output. The desired characteristic of being collision-free means that two different inputs to 
the function will not result in the same output being produced by the hash function. The reason for 
using a one-way hash function for digital signatures is to address performance issues found in some 
cryptographic algorithms. For some cryptographic algorithms, encryption or decryption of a complete 
document for the purpose of signing the information would require too much computation time relative 
to the performance requirements of an application. One-way hash functions create a short piece of 
data which is encrypted and decrypted by a cryptographic algorithm for the purpose of signing longer 
amounts of information. To validate a digital signature, the validator creates the message digest for the 
information received, decrypts the message digest contained with the information, and compares the 
two resulting message digests. If the message digests match, the digital signature is considered valid. 
Otherwise, the digital signature is invalid. 
The Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-I) is the one-way hash function required by all MISPC com­
ponents. The details of SHA-1 can be found in [29]. The three public-key cryptographic algorithms 
specified in the MISPC are RSA [35], Digital Signature Standard (DSS) [30], and (3) Elliptic Curve Dig­
ital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [2]. For interoperability^ and verification purposes, one or more of 
^MISPC components that use the same cryptographic algorithm(s) shotild be able to interact with each other in a 
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the three public-key cryptographic algorithms must be implemented by MISPC components to generate 
the required digital signatures. 
The other type of cryptographic algorithm mentioned in the MISPC are MACs which are key-
dependent one-way hash functions. N'lACs are similar to digital signatures, but use secret keys and 
do not allow for non-repudiation. The MISPC requires the use of Data Encryption Standard Message 
Authentication Code (DES-MAC) for MAC generation. The details of DES-MAC c£in be found in [31]. 
The Path Validation Engine Specified by the MISPC 
The Path Validation Engine (PVE) is used by MISPC components to validate a sequence of certifi­
cates. The last certificate in the sequence is called the end certificate while the others are known as 
intermediate certificates. If only an end certificate is present, it was issued by a CA which the Client 
trusts and the Client goes through one iteration of the validation procedure. If intermediate certificates 
are present, the end certificate to be validated was issued by a CA which the Client does not directly 
trust. Thus, a path between a certificate issued by a CA trusted by the Client and the end certifi­
cate issued by the non-trusted CA must be validated. The MISPC defines a PVE by reference to the 
International Standards Orgeinization (ISO)-Open Systems Interconnection-The Directory: Authenti­
cation Framework specification recommendation X.509 which gives a natural language description of a 
state-based vaUdation engine [26]. 
The PVE is a state machine composed of six inputs, five outputs, and seven state variables. The 
input variables of the PVE are: (II) a set of certificates making up a certificate path. (12) a trusted 
public key to validate the first certificate in the path, (13) an initial set of policies acceptable to the 
validator, (14) an initial indicator used to explicitly indicate that at least one of the acceptable policies 
must be present in all certificates in the path, (15) an initial policy mapping inhibitor indicator which 
tells if policy mapping is not 8dlowed in the certificate path, and (16) the current time/date. In X.509 
version 3 certificates, some extensions have been defined to indicate under what conditions a certificate 
can be used. The certificate's extensions can also define a certificate's policies. Policy mapping is the 
act of processing these certificate extensions for use by the PVE. The output variables of the PVE 
are: (01) an indicator telling whether the certificate path was validated or not, (02) an error code 
(when a path is invalid), (03) details on any policy mapping that occurred during path evaluation, and 
(04) the set of all acceptable policies which are constrained by CAs in the path and all qualifiers of 
the policies or a special value indicating that any policy is acceptable. If (04) has the special value 
productive maimer (i.e. issue certificates, revoke certificates, etc.). 
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indication "any policy", another output, (05), is generated containing a set of all acceptable policy 
qualifiers encountered in the path. The state variables of the PVE are: (SI) the set of policies currently 
acceptable to the validator, (S2) the set of policies acceptable to the CAs in the certification path, (S3) 
the set of sub-trees within which all subject names of subsequent certificates must fall, (S4) the set 
of sub-trees within which no subject names of subsequent certificates can fall. (S5) an indicator used 
to tell that at least one acceptable policy must be in every certificate of the path, (S6) an Indicator 
used to prohibit policy mapping, and (S7) an indicator used to show that a policy constraint or policy 
mapping suspension is pending and the number of certificates which will be processed before the pending 
requirement becomes effective. 
The process used by the PVE to validate a certificate path for a set of certificates begins by the 
initialization of the state variables: (SI) is set to the value of (13), (S2) is set to the special value which 
indicates any policy is acceptable, (S3) is set to allow emy sub-tree (i.e. all possible name-space), (S4) 
is set to the empty set, (S5) is set to the value of (14), (S6) is set to the value of (15), and (S7) is 
cleared to indicate a policy constraint or policy mapping is not pending. Each certificate in the path 
is processed by checking that (a) the digital signature and date of the certificate are valid, (b) the 
certificate's subject and issuer relationships are correct, and (c) the certificate has not been revoked. 
If the certificate passes (a)-(c), it is further processed using the state variables. If (55) is set and 
(51) is not set to accept any policy, the policy extensions of the certificate are checked to see that at 
least one of the policies in (51) is present. If any policy extensions are present in the certificate and 
indicated to be critical, a new value of (S2) is calculated by taking the intersection of the policies found 
in the certificate and (82). The intersection of (52) and (51) is checked to ensure it is non-empty. The 
certificate's subject name is checked to see that it is falls into the allowable name-space (S3) and outside 
the disallowed name-space (54). For an intermediate certificate, two additional processing checks are 
required. If the basic constraints extension is present in the certificate, the ca field of the extension is 
checked for a setting of '^rue". If the path length constraint field of the basic constraint extension is 
present in the certificate, a check is made to see that the current certificate path length does not violate 
the constraint. If any one of the aforementioned checks fails, the certificate validation process halts and 
a failure is returned with the appropriate error code. If all the certificate's checks pass, the certificate 
validation process terminates by returning (1) a successful indication, (2) a set of policy identifiers, (3) 
the required policy qualifiers, and (4) details of the policy mapping that occurred during the processing. 
When the PVE is processing an intermediate certificate, the state variables are updated. The PVE 
state variables updated are the set of acceptable policies of the validator (51), the set of acceptable 
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policies of the CAs (S2), the allowed and disallowed name-spaces (S3 and S4, respectively), the value 
of the indicator used to show that at least one acceptable policy must be present in the certificate (S5), 
the value of the indicator used to inhibit policy mapping (S6), and the values of the indicators used to 
show that a policy constraint or policy mapping suspension is pending and the number of certificates 
to be processed before the pending requirement takes effective (S7). The state variables which are the 
most streiightforward to update are (S3) and (S4). If the permitted name-space extension is present 
in the certificate, (S3) is updated by simply taking the intersection of current value and the permitted 
name-space found in the certificate. (S4) is updated in a similar fashion by taking the union of current 
value and the prohibited name-space, if the prohibited name-space extension is present in the certificate. 
(55) can only be changed fi:om clewed to set during the processing of any specific certificate path. If 
(85) is cleared eind the explicit policy pending part of (S7) is set, the number of certificates to skip part 
of (S7) is decremented. If zero is the result of decrementing the number of certificates to skip part of 
(S7), then (S5) is set. The nimiber of certificates to skip part of (S7) is set to a value found within a 
certificate containing either the explicit policy or inhibit policy mapping constraint extension. If the 
value found in the certificate is zero, (S5) is set immediately. Otherwise, the explicit policy pending part 
of (S7) is set and the number of certificates to skip is set to the non-zero value found in the certificate. 
If the number of certificates to skip part of (S7) currently is a non-zero ^-alue, the value is updated to 
the lesser of the current value and the value found in the certificate. 
Finally, (SI), (S2)'', and (S6) are updated only if (S6) is cleared. Similar to (S5) in the previous 
paragraph, (S6) can only be changed from clear to set during the processing of any specific certificate 
path. If (S6) is not set, any policy mapping extensions are processed with respect to the set of acceptable 
policies of the validator and CAs ((SI) and (S2), respectively) and added to the appropriate set as 
required. If the number of certificates to skip in the certificate is zero, then (S6) is set immediately. 
Otherwise, the inhibit policy mapping pending part of (S7) is set and the number of certificates to skip 
is set to the non-zero value found in the certificate. If the number of certificates to skip part of (S7) 
ciirrently is a non-zero value, the value is updated to the lesser of the current value and the value found 
in the certificate. 
''This update is supplemental to the update described when a certificate policy's extension is present and indicated to 
be critical. 
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MISPC Data Structures: Certificates, Certificate Revocation List, and PKI 
Messages 
The certificates, CRLs, and PKI messages will be reviewed to complete this overview of the MISPC. 
The certificates, CRLs, and PKI messages used by the MISPC are specified using ASN.l. It should be 
noted that the ASN.l definitions for the certificates, CRLs, and PKI messages are a subset of the data 
structures found in [23] and [1]. As a result, some fields defined as optional are required while other 
non-optional fields are not used or are ignored by the MISPC. The certificates and CRLs are based on 
X.509 and are shown in Figures 2.3 eind 2.4, respectively. Even though the ASN.l specifications indicate 
a type of SEQUENCE for the data structures, the actual order of the fields specified may be different 
when synthesized due to the tagging of fields done when encoding and decoding ASN.l specified data 
structures. To clarify the notation for the data structures to be presented in the text of this section, 
data structure Types will be in bold and begin with a capital letter. Data structure fields will begin 
with a lower case letter and be in italics. 
The certificates specified in the MISPC are composed of ten fields, of which three are optional. The 
optional fields need not be used in order for the PKI to work properly but are included to support 
advanced functionality, such as conditions under which the public key found in a certificate may or 
may not be used. All the fields of the certificate are covered by the digital signature generated by the 
issuing CA as indicated by the user defined type SIGNED. The version field is used to indicate the 
version of the certificate. Currently, there axe three versions of X.509 based certificates; however, the 
MISPC specifies the use of version 3 certificates. The serialNumber field is an integer value assigned by 
Certificate ::= 
version 
serialNumber 
signature 
issuer 
validity 
subject 
sub jectPublicKey Info 
issuerU niqueldentifier 
subject L'niqueldentifier 
extensions 
SIGNED { SEQL^NCE { 
[0] VersionDEFALTLT vl, 
CertificateSerialNumber, 
Algorithmldentifier 
Name, 
Validity, 
Name, 
SubjectPublicKeylnfo, 
[1] D^IPLICIT Uniqueldentifier OPTIONAL, 
[2] IMPLICIT Uniqueldentifier OPTIONAL, 
[3] Extensions Optional }} 
Figmre 2.3 ASN.l Specification of an MISPC Certificate. 
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CertificateList ::= 
version 
signature 
issuer 
thisUpdate 
nextUpdate 
revokedCertificates 
userCertificate 
revocationDate 
crlEntryExtensions 
crlExtensions 
SIGNED { SEQUENCE { 
Version OPTIONAL, 
Algorithmldentifier, 
Name, 
ChoiceOfTime, 
ChoiceOfTime OPTIONAL. 
SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { 
CertificateSerialN umber. 
ChoiceOfTime. 
Extensions OPTIONAL } OPTIONAL, 
[0] Extensions OPTIONAL }} 
Figure 2.4 ASN.l Specification of an MISPC CRL. 
the CA that issued the certificate. The integer should be unique with respect to the issuing CA so that 
an issuer name/serial number pair csm be used to uniquely identify a certificate. The signature field is 
used to indicate the digital signature algorithm (RSA, DSA, or ECDSA) used by the CA to sign the 
certificate. The issuer field indicates the globally unique identifier associated with the issuing CA. The 
subject field is the globally imique identifier of the subject of the certificate. Both the issuer and subject 
fields are of type Name which indicates that X.500 distinguished names should be used. The validity 
field indicates the dates the certificate is valid. It is composed of a sequence of two fields, a beginning 
date and an ending date. The dates are to be expressed in Coordinated Universal Time, UTCTime. 
referenced to Greenwich Mean Time with a resolution of seconds. The subjectPublicKeylnfo field is 
composed of a sequence of two fields: one indicates the pubUc key cryptographic algorithm including 
any pubUc parameters and the other contains the actual public key. The issuerUniqueldentifier and 
subjectUniqueldentifier are optional fields used to handle the reuse of subject eind/or issuer names over 
time. Finally, extensions is an optional field composed of a sequence of three fields. The fields indicate 
the name, criticality, and value of the extension included in the certificate. A certificate can contain 
any number of standard or private extensions. One standard extension is used to indicate the allowed 
uses of the public key contained in the certificate (e.g. endpherment only). 
The CRLs specified by the MISPC contain seven fields of which three are optional. Just like a 
certificate, all the fields of a CRL are covered by the digital signature generated by the issuing CA as 
indicated by the user defined type SIGNED. The version field is used to indicate which version of the 
X.509 CRL is used. Currently, the MISPC specifies the use of X.509 version 2 CRLs. The signature field 
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indicates the digital signature algorithm (RSA, DSA, or ECDSA) losed to sign the CRL. The issuer field 
indicates the globally unique identifier of the issuing CA. The this Update field indicates the date the 
CRL was generated by the CA and the next Update is a field that indicates the date by which the next 
CRL will be issued. The dates are to be expressed in UTCTime referenced to Greenwich Mean Time 
with a resolution of seconds. The revokedCertificates field contains the list of revoked certificates. Each 
revoked certificate listed contains the serial number of the certificate, the date of the revocation, and 
optioned CRL extensions used to indicate additional information such as why the certificate was revoked. 
Finally, crlExtensions is an optional field composed of a sequence of three fields. The fields indicate the 
name, criticality, and value of the extension to the CRL. The CRL can contain any number of standard 
or private extensions. The standard CRL extensions are used to associate additional attributes to a 
given CRL such as the distribution point of the CRL. 
The general layout of the PKI messages specified by the MISPC is shown in Figure 2.5. The PKI 
messages are composed of four fields of which two are optional. The protection field is an optional field 
containing a digital signature of the header and body fields of the message, but is required by the MISPC. 
The extraCcrts is an optional field that is not required by the MISPC. The header and body fields of a 
PKI message are shown in Figures 2.6 and 2.7, respectively. The header field contains a sequence of 11 
fields of which all but three are optional. The three required fields are pvno, sender, and recipient fields. 
The pvno field is used to indicate the version format of the PKI message. For version 1 of the MISPC, 
the pvno field value is specified to be zero. The sender and recipient fields are used to identify the 
sender and receiver of the PKI message by using X.500 distinguished names or Internet electronic mail 
names. messageTime is an optional field used to indicate the time the message was generated, but is 
required by the MISPC. The format of GeneralizedTime type is more general than the Coordinated 
Universal Time (UTCTime) type. A date's resolution can vary (seconds, minutes, hours, days, etc.) 
and can be relative to a local (Eastern, Central, etc.) or universal (Greenwich Mean Time) reference. 
However, the MISPC requires the messageTime field be expressed in Greenwich Mean Time with a 
resolution of seconds. Another optional field that is required by the MISPC is the protectionAlg field 
used to indicate the digitsd signature algorithm (RSA, DSA, or ECDSA) or message authentication code 
(DES-MAC) used to ensure that the information in the PKI message has not been modified. This field 
is used in coordination with the PKI message protection field mentioned previously. The senderKlD 
and recipKID are optional fields used to indicate the key used to protect the PKI message. This field 
is useful when entities have multiple keys and specific keys need to be identified. The transactionID is 
an optional field used to identify with which transaction the given PKI message is associated when a 
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PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE { 
header PKIHeader, 
body PKIBody, 
protection [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL, 
extraCerts [1] SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL } 
Figiire 2.5 ASN.l Specification of an MISPC PKI Message. 
PKIHeader 
pvno 
sender 
recipient 
messageTime 
protectionAlg 
sender KID 
recipKID 
transactionID 
senderNonce 
recipNonce 
fteeText 
SEQUENCE{ 
INTEGER {ft)ki-version I (0)}, 
GeneralName, 
GeneralName, 
[0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, 
[1] Algorithmldentifier OPTIONAL, 
[2] Keyldentifier OPTIONAL, 
[3] Keyldentifier OPTIONAL, 
[4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, 
[5| OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, 
[6) OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, 
[7] PKIPreeText OPTIONAL } 
Figiire 2.6 ASN.l Specification of PKIHeader Element. 
component is conducting multiple PKI transactions. The transactionID field is required by the MISPC 
for ORA Certificate Registration and Certificate Revocation transaction messages. The senderNonce 
and recipNonce are optional fields used to provide protection from replay attacks and to provide a 
level of authentication. The senderNonce is created by the entity that is generating the current PKI 
message. The recipNonce is a nonce that was generated by the entity that will be receiving the current 
PKI message and that was passed to the sender in the senderNonce field previously. Finally, JreeText 
is an optional field used to include additional information (for human consimiption) about the PKI 
message. 
The second required PKI message field is body which can contain any one of 24 different PKI mes­
sage types (see Figure 2.7). However, only six of the 24 PKI message types (in bold) are required 
by the MISPC. The CertReqContent is used by an entity to request a certificate. It is defined as a 
sequence of elements of type FullCertTemplate which allows for the processing of multiple requests 
by a single transaction. However, the feature of multiple certificate requests in a single transaction is 
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PKroody CHOICE { 
ir [0] InitReqContent, 
ip [1] InitRepContent, 
cr [2] CertReqContent, 
cp [3] CertRepContent, 
plOcr [4] PKCSlOCertReqContent, 
popdecc [5] POPODecKeyChallContent, 
popdecr [6] POPDecKeyRespContent, 
kur [7] KeyUpdReqContent, 
kup [8] KeyUpdRepContent, 
krr [9j KeyRecReqContent, 
krp [10] KeyRecRepContent, 
rr [11] RevReqContent, 
rp [12] RevRepContent, 
ccr [13] CrossCertReqContent, 
ccp [14] CrossCertRepContent, 
ckuann [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent, 
cann [16] CertAnnContent, 
rann [17] RevAnnContent, 
crlann [18] CRLAnnContent, 
conf [19] PKIConfirmContent, 
nested [20] NestedMessageContent, 
infor [21] PKIInfoReqContent, 
infop [22] PKIInfoRepContent, 
error [23] ErrorMsgContent } 
Figxire 2.7 ASN.l Specification of PKIBody Element. 
not supported by the MISPC, so only one FuilCertTemplate will be found in CertReqContent. 
Six fields compose the FuilCertTemplate type as shown in Figure 2.8. However, only the certRe-
qld, oldCertld, POPOSigningKey, and certTemplate fields (in bold) are specified in the MISPC. The 
certReqId field is used to match a response to a given request while oldCertId field identifies a current 
or expired certificate for the subject. POPOSigningKey field provides information to assure the subject 
has possession of the private key for the new certificate's public key. certTemplate field contains infor­
mation about the specific certificate being requested as defined by the CertTemplate type shown in 
Figure 2.9. The CertTemplate type has 10 optional fields used to request specific characteristics for 
the certificate to be generated. The publicKey field which contains the public key and the specific cryp­
tographic algorithm (RSA, DSA, or ECDSA) of the certificate is the only required field. The isauerUID 
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CertReqContent FuUCertTemplatcs 
PullCertTemplates SEQUENCE OF FuUCertTemplate 
PullCertTemplate 
certReqId 
oidCertId 
cert Template 
popoSigningKey 
archiveOptions 
pubiicationlnfo 
SEQUENCE{ 
INTEGER, 
CertTemplate, 
[0] POPOSigningKey OPTIONAL, 
[1] PKIArchiveOptions OPTIONAL, 
[2] PKIPubUcationlnfo OPTIONAL, 
[3] Certid OPTIONAL } 
Figure 2.8 ASN.l Specification of CertReqContent, PullCertTemplates, and 
FuUCertTemplate Elements. 
and subject UID fields are not supported by the MISPC. The version field is used to request the version 
of the X.509 certificate to be generated which is version 3 for the MISPC. The serial field is used to 
request a particular serial number for a certificate or to indicate a request is related to a previously 
issued certificate. The signingAlg field is used to indicate the cryptographic signing algorithm (RSA. 
DSA, or ECDSA) that will be used to sign the generated certificate. The subject and issuer fields £u:e 
used to indicate a specific subject nzime and issiiing CA name for the certificate using the X.500 distin­
guished naming convention. The validity field is used to indicate a specific time interval for which the 
new certificate will be valid. The extensions field is used to indicate a request for certificate extensions 
such as public key usage. 
As an alternative to requesting certificates using PKI messages with a body field of type CertRe­
qContent, an entity can request certificates using the type PKCSlOCertReqContent which is 
composed of three fields as shown in Figure 2.10. The signatureAlgorithm field indicates the cryp­
tographic algorithm used to generate the digital signature contained in the signature field. The cer-
tificateRequestlnfo field of PKCSlOCertReqContent contains the information about the certificate 
to be generated. certificateRequestlnfo includes the preferred certificate version {version), a preferred 
subject name {subject), the public key and cryptographic algorithm {subjectPublicKey) (RSA, DSA, or 
ECDSA), and any other attributes about the certificate. The attributes field may be ignored by MISPC 
compliant components. 
In response to a PKI message with a body field of CertReqContent or PKCSlOCertReqContent, 
a PKI message with a body field of CertRepContent is generated (See Figure 2.11). It is composed of 
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Cert Template ::= SEQUENCE { 
version [0] Version OPTIONAL, 
serial [1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, 
signingAlg [2] Algorithmldentifier OPTIONAL, 
subject [3] Name OPTIONAL, 
validity [4] OptionalValidity OPTIONAL, 
issuer [5] Name OPTIONAL, 
publicKey [6] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL, 
issuerlD [7] Uniqueldentifier OPTIONAL, 
subjectID [8] Uniqueldentifier OPTIONAL, 
extensions [9] Extensions OPTIONAL } 
Figure 2.9 ASN.l Specification of CertTemplate Element. 
PKCSlOCertReqContent 
certificationRequestlnfo 
signatureAlgorithm 
signature 
CcrtificationRequestlnfo 
version 
subject 
subjectPublicKeylnfo 
attributes 
SEQUENCE { 
CertificationRequestlnfo, 
SignatureAlgorithmldentifier, 
Signature } 
SEQUENCE { 
Version, 
Name, 
SubjectPublicKeylnfo, 
[Oj IMPLICIT Attributes } 
Figure 2.10 ASN.l Specification of PKCSlOCertReqContent and Certification­
Requestlnfo Elements. 
the response field emd the optional caPub field which is a certificate. The response field is a sequence of 
CertResponse type elements which allows for multiple certificates to be issued by a single transaction: 
however, the MISPC ooly supports messages for a single certificate per transaction. Each CertRe-
sponse element contains the request identification number {certReqID), the status of the certificate 
request (accepted, rejected, etc.), any reason codes needed {certRepStatus), emd the certified key pair 
(certifiedKeyPair). The certifiedKeyPair &dd is composed of four fields which are specified as optional. 
However, the MISPC requires that the certificate field be present as it is used to hold the newly issued 
certificate. The encryptCert, privateKey, and publicationlnfo fields are not used by the MISPC. 
A PKI message with a body field type of RevReqContent is used by an entity to request the 
revocation of a certificate. The RevReqContent is composed of a sequence of RevDetails elements 
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CertRepContent 
caPub 
response 
SEQUENCE { 
[1] Certificate Optional, 
SEQUENCE OF CertResponse } 
CertResponse 
certReqId 
certRepStatus 
certifiedKeyPair 
SEQUENCE { 
INTEGER, 
PKIStatusInfo, 
CertifiedKeyPair } 
CertifiedKeyPair 
certificate 
encryptedCert 
privateKey 
publicationlnfo 
SEQUENCE { 
[0] Certificate OPTIONAL, 
[1] EncryptedValue OPTIONAL, 
[2] EncPrivKey OPTIONAL, 
[3] PKIPubUcationlnfo OPTIONAL} 
Figure 2.11 ASN.l Specification of CertRepContent, CertResponse, and Cer­
tifiedKeyPair Elements. 
which allows for multiple certificates to be revoked by a single transaction: however, the \^IISPC only 
supports messages that revoke a single certificate per transaction. Each R^vDetails element gives 
specific information on the revocation of a given certificate (See Figure 2.12). RevDetails contains 
four fields, of which one is optional. The optional field badSinceDate indicates how long a certificate 
has been bad, in GeneralizedTime type format, to the best of the requesting entity's knowledge. 
The certDetails field specifies information about the certificate which is to be revoked (subject/issuer 
name, serial number, type of cryptographic algorithm, etc.). The revocationReason field is used to 
indicate why a certificate is being revoked (key compromised, issuer CA compromised, hold placed on 
certificate, etc.). In response to a certificate revocation request, a PKI message with a body field of 
type RfvRepContent is generated (See Figure 2.13). RevRepContent is composed of three fields 
of which two are optional. The optional oris field is not required by N'lISPC components. The status 
field is used to indicate the status of the revocation request (accepted, rejected, etc.). The optional 
revCerts field is specified as a sequence of Certlds types. Each Certld contains the identification of a 
certificate that was revoked by the current revocation transaction. The final PKI message body type is 
PKIConfirmContent which has a NULL value indicating that all required information is contained 
in the header of the PKI message (See Figure 2.14). 
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RevReqContent SEQUENCE OF RevDetails 
RevDetaik ::= 
certDetails 
revocationReason 
badSinceDate 
crlEntryDetJiils 
SEQUENCE{ 
CertTemplate, 
ReasonFlags, 
[0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL. 
Extensions} 
Figure 2.12 ASN.l Specification of RevReqContent and RevDetails Elements. 
RevRepContent SEQUENCE { 
status PKIStatusInfo, 
revCerts [0] SEQUENCE OF Certld OPTIONAL, 
oris [1] SEQUENCE OF CertificateList OPTIONAL } 
Figure 2.13 ASN.l Specification of RevRepContent Element. 
PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL 
Figure 2.14 ASN.l Specification of PKIConfirmContent Element. 
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3 TEST SUITE DEVELOPMENT FOR THE MISPC 
Limitations of Applying the TTF to MISPC 
The application of the TTF to the MISPC will be done to demonstrate the limitations of framework. 
This demonstration will provide a gioide as to what needs to be improved and enhanced when a new 
structured framework is proposed. As shown in Chapter 1, the TTF is applied to the valid input 
space, VISx, as defined by the specification of application X. For the MISPC, a general input space, 
ISMISPC, can be defined using the ASN.l data structures shown in Fig\ires 2.3-2.14. The ISMISPC can 
be further partitioned into a valid and invalid input space for the MISPC [VISMISPC and IISMISPC^ 
respectively) based on requirements found within the MISPC such as fields defined as optional in the 
ASN.l description but are required to be present by the MISPC. This preliminary partitioning of the 
MISPC's input space, shown in Figure 3.1, already starts to highlight some of the limitations of the 
TTF. 
The first limitation of the TTF is that it only works with the defined valid input space of an 
application and ignores an application's invalid input space. When the TTF was proposed, it was 
correctly argued that nothing can be concluded about an application's behavior when unspecified or 
invalid inputs are presented. However, this limits the TTF from being used in the development of test 
suites that are not concerned about behavior when invalid or imspecified inputs are presented to an 
application. In addition, an argument can be made that considering only the valid input space does not 
explore a significant amount of the general input space that is defined by the apphcation's specification. 
A simple example will be given focusing on the header data structure of the MISPC shown in Figure 2.6 
to illustrate this argument. The header data structure consists of three required fields and eight optional 
fields. If ail the fields are considered optional, that results in 2^^-l or 2047 possible header formats, 
excluding the header which contains no fields. This set of possible header formats (,Fneader) can be 
psulitioned into the set of vaUd and invalid formats {VFaeader and IFueader'. respectively) based on 
the tact of the specification. The specification states that, in addition to the three required fields, two 
of the optional fields are required by the MISPC. This results in VFueader having 2® — 1 or 63 formats 
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and IF Header having 1984 formats from Fntader, respectively. This means that the VFHeader makes 
up 3.08 percent of Fneader while IFneader makes up 96.92 percent. This simple analysis only considers 
the formats based on a field's presence or absence and not the vsilues contained by the fields, but it 
demonstrates how much of a well defined general input space is not explored by the TTF. 
Another limitation of the TTF is its ability to express the interaction between dilferent components 
defined by a specification. When the TTF was first proposed, this limitation was acknowledged. The 
MISPC provides an excellent example of the difficulty the TTF has capturing the interactive natiure 
of a specified system. The MISPC is a collection of application specifications (CA, ORA, CH, Client) 
that compose an overall system specification. In addition to specifying each component, the MISPC 
describes how each component should interact with each other. An MISPC system csin be peurtitioned 
into different sub-components in a similar fashion as the input space. Figure 3.2 shows one peirticular 
partitioning where the first level of division is based on the different components described by the 
MISPC. The next level of partitioning is provided by dividing a component into the roles that it may 
assume. This example concludes by partitioning each role into the transactions for which it can be a 
participant. The resulting partition is desired when developing a test suite with multiple components 
to capture the relationship of the different components to each other. This extension to the TTF shows 
the desired relationships but is not able to tie them back to the input space partitions. This makes it 
difficult to use the TTF in a unified way when developing test suites for a system composed of multiple 
components even though it can be applied to each component individually. 
Finally, two fixable limitations of the TTF which can be corrected by modifying the framework will 
now be presented. The relationship between ISMISPC aiid the general input space, IS, is not explicitly 
expressed by the TTF because it begins with the ISMISPC input space. This limitation is overcome by 
providing an additional level of partitioning above the original partitioning and is shown in Figure 3.3. 
The modified partition shows that IS can be partitioned into ISMISPC as defined by the MISPC and 
ISMISPC which is not described by the MISPC. The significance of this refined partitioning is that 
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two distinct invalid input spaces are represented, I^MJSPC HSMISPC , and their relationship is 
expUcitly demonstrated in a global context. The invalid space of is the set of inputs that do 
not conform to the MISPC general input space, ISMISPC^ as defined by the ASN.l description of the 
MISPC data structures. This would include any ASN.l data structure descriptions that could be created 
but are not expUcitly mappablc to the MISPC. The set of inputs that conform to ISMISPC but do 
not meet the additional MISPC requirements are captured in IISMISPC partition. This would include 
MISPC ASN.l data structures that are missing required fields. Another limitation of the TTF that can 
be corrected is the firamework's ability to generate a sequence of inputs. This limitation is overcome 
not by modifying the firamework but by using elements from the partitions to generate sequences. For 
example, two elements of the VISMISPC can be concatenated together to form an input sequence. 
After the ISMISPC is sufficiently partitioned, it might be shown that both elements of the sequence 
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are certificate request messages. However, the framework is still unable to capture which component 
generates an input sequence. The sequence could be generated by a CH, ORA, CA or any combination 
of these MISPC components. Likewise, the input sequence can be presented to either a CA, ORA or 
both. 
The limitations of the TTF that are not correctable require that a new framework be proposed. 
The new framework should address the invalid input space of a specification to allow for test suite 
development when reliability and assurance is required. In addition, the framework should be able 
to capture the interaction between components of a specification, so test suites for multi-component 
systems C£in be directly derived. 
A Proposed Structured Framework for Test Suite Development 
The proposed structured framework presented in this section will use the partitioning concepts of 
the TTF but apply them in a more general framework. The result should be a framework that can 
derive test suites for both multi-component systems and provide tests for completeness and robustness. 
In addition, the proposed structured framework will provide the context to understand the relationships 
of the input space and the components that compose a system. The proposed framework uses basic 
set notation to express the components of a test suite. The fundamental idea behind the proposed 
framework is that a set of input-output pairs defines a specific test suite. Once these input-output 
pairs are defined by the proposed framework, a specific test suite can be implemented following the 
results of the framework. The framework initially develops a test suite at the abstract level, then 
instantiates a specific test suite for implementation. By describing a test suite in these two levels, the 
framework can unify the abstract/theoretical and implementation aspects of test suite development. 
Where the abstract test suite is based on the theoretical testing techniques applied, the instantiation 
of a test suite depends on the implementation of the application to be tested. The result is that the 
framework provides a basis by which test data can be selected and generated for the implementation of 
a specific test suite. 
The basic definition of the proposed framework begins using the variable y to denote a particular 
specification. The specification can be expressed by formal or informal specification techniques, but 
the framework views any specification as simply an abstract description. The framework denotes the 
abstract test suite, S, with respect to specification y by S(y). S(y) is a set of input-output pairs which 
is the fundamental view the proposed framework has of a test suite. By defining a test suite as a set of 
input-output pairs, it does not express how an input value is transformed into an output value which 
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makes the proposed framework a black-box testing strategy. The input-output pairs of S(y) are created 
from the set of abstract inputs and outputs defined by specification y and denoted by I(y) and 0(y), 
respectively. The elements of the sets I(y) and 0(y) can be a single abstract input/output or a sequence 
of them. The result is that the abstract test suite csin initially be written as the expression shown in 
Equation 3.1. The proposed framework further defines two more sets that cein be defined directly from 
a specification. The set C(y) is used to denote the set of abstract components defined by specification 
y. This allows the framework to easily express a specification composed of multiple components. In 
addition, the set of all abstract transactions specified by the specification y is denoted by T(y). An ele­
ment of T(y) is an abstract tremsaction t which consists of a set of abstract messages used to implement 
the transaction it and is denoted by Tm (t). An abstract message, m, of a transaction is either gener­
ated or processed by abstract components of the specification which are determined by the operations 
Mc{m) and Mp{m), respectively. Mcijn) defines the set of abstract components that can generate 
the abstract message m. Mp{m) defines the set of abstract components that can process the abstract 
message m. This allows the framework to capture the interactive relationships between the different 
abstract components of a specification. The framework provides a notation that allows attributes about 
an abstract message m to be expressed. The syntax < message > . < valid/invalid >format iv) is 
used to indicate the validity of an abstract message's format with respect to the specification y. The 
syntax can be extended to indicate the validity of an abstract message's values based on the speci­
fication y, < message > . < valid/invalid >format {y)- < valid/invalid >vaiuc (y)- This notation 
allows the framework to express more information about the test data of an abstract test suite. For 
example, m.invalidformatiy) indicates that am abstract message's format is invalid with respect to spec­
ification y-not all of the required fields as mandated by the specification y for the message are present. 
m.validformatiy)-v(did{y) would indicate that an abstract message's format is valid with respect to 
specification y and that the abstract values of the message are valid - all of the required fields as 
mandated by the specification y for the message are present and the abstract vzdues contsiined in the 
fields are correct. Finally, two sets are defined to unify the abstract components, transactions, inputs, 
and outputs of the specification. The operation T(y,c) defines the set of abstract trsmsactions for an 
abstract component c. This allows the set T(y) to be written as the expression shown in Equation 3.2. 
The operation Ppair{t^ c) defines the set of input-output pairs for an abstract transaction t with re­
spect to abstract component c. The operation Ppairit-c) can be written as the expression shown in 
Equation 3.3. The expression for S(y) can be rewritten using the defined sets and operations as the 
expression in Equation 3.4. The expression shown in Equation 3.4 defines an abstract test siiite for all 
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components of the specification but can be modified to reflect an abstract test suite for a particular 
component c as shown in Equation 3.5. 
S{y)  =  {[i.o] I i  e I {y )  and  o  €  0{y )}  (3.1) 
r(y) = {t 11 e Tiy ,  c), Vc € C{y)} (3.2) 
Ppair{ t , c )  = {[i.o] I 3m 6 Tmi t )  such  tha t  {o  =  m AND c  €  Mc{m))  OR (3.3) 
(i = m AND c  e A/p(m))} 
S(y)  = {[i,o] I [i.o] 6 Ppatr{ t , c ) ,  V t  €  T{y ,c ) .  Vc € C(y)} (3.4) 
S[y ,c )  = {[i,o] I [i,o] e Ppair( t , c )  ,Vf 6 T[y ,c )}  (3.5) 
A partitioning of the basic sets of the proposed framework can be done based on the required and 
optional functionality defined by the specification. If all the functionality described by the specification 
is required, then the optional set becomes empty. An abstract test suite, S(y), can be partitioned into 
tes t  su i t es  tha t  t e s t  the  requ i red  and  op t iona l  func t iona l i t i e s  o f  the  spec i f i ca t ion ,  Sniy )  and  So(y) ,  
respectively. This allows the abstract test suite to be written as the expression in Equation 3.6. The 
abstract test siiites Sii{y) and So(y) are constructed using the set of abstract transactions, T(y). 
T(y) can be partitioned like the abstract test suite into the required and optional transactions of the 
specification, Tfl(j/) and To{y), respectively. Likewise, the operation T(y,c) used to define the set 
of abstract transactions for an abstract component can be refined into two operations, Tii{y,c) and 
Toiy^c)- The operation TR{y,c) is used to determine the required abstract transactions for abstract 
component c as described by the specification y while To{y,c) determines the abstract component's 
optional transactions. This allows the abstract test suites SR{y) and So{y) to be written as the 
expressions in Equations 3.7 and 3.8, respectively. The expressions shown in Equations 3.7 and 3.8 
define required and optional abstract test suite for all components of the specification but can be 
modified to reflect a required and optional abstract test suite for a particular component c as shown in 
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Equations 3.9 and 3.10, respectively. 
S{y)  =  SR{y)uSo{y)  (3.6) 
Sniv )  = {[t,o] I [ i ,o]  e Ppair{t, c ) ,  Vt e TR(y ,c ) ,  Vc € C7(y)} (3.7) 
'5o(y) = {[i,o] I [i,o] € Ppairit, c ) ,  Vt €  To iy ,c ) .  Vc € C(y)} (3.8) 
5fl(y,c) = {[i.o] I [i,o] 6 PpaiAt, c ) ,  Vt € Tfi(j/,c)} (3.9) 
So(y ,c )  =  {[t,o] I [i,o] 6 Ppair{ t , c ) ,  Vf € ro(y,c)} (3.10) 
The proposed framework has defined the structure for the development of £in abstract test suite that 
will be used to instantiate a test suite for an implementation. The instantiation of the test suite requires 
some knowledge about the implementation of the application to be tested. In general, the amount of 
information known about an implementation varies and this variation will aSect the instantiation of a 
test suite and the way it can be implemented. The framework uses z to denote a specific implementation 
of an application. The set of logical inputs and outputs of the implementation z is denoted by I[{2) 
and Oi{z). respectively. The behavior, B, for an implementation of an application can be described 
by its input-output pairs and can be written as the expression shown in Equation 3.11. The elements 
of the sets Ii^z) and 0[(2) can be a single instance of an input/output or a sequence of them. The 
framework can use the implementation z to define two more sets. The set C/(z) is used to denote 
the set of components instantiated by the implementation of application z. The set T/(z) is the set 
of transactions instantiated by the implementation z. An element of T[{z) is an instantiation of a 
transaction t' which consists of a set of messages used to implement the transaction and is denoted 
by A message, m', of a transaction is either generated or processed by the implemented 
components of the specification and can be determined using the operations and M [ p {m' ) ,  
respectively. Mic(Tn') defines the set of instantiated components that can generate the instantiated 
message m'. Mip {m') defines the set of instantiated components that can process the instantiated 
message m'. The proposed framework provides a notation that allows attributes about a message m' or 
a set of messages M' to be expressed. In general, the syntax takes the following form: < message >' 
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. < valid/invalid ><aUribute> ill)- The syntax < message >' . < valid I invalid > format [y )  is 
used to indicate the validity of instantiated message formats based on the specification y. The syntax 
can be extended to indicate the validity of instantiated message values bcised on the specification 
y, < message >' . < valid/invalid >format • < valid/invalid >uaiue (j/)- This notation allows 
the framework to express more detailed information about the instantiation of the test data for a 
test suite that is to be implemented. For example, m'.invalidformativ) indicates that an instantiated 
message's format is invalid with respect to specification y-not all of the required fields as mandated 
by the specification y for the message are present, m'.validformat•^o.HdvaUeiy) would indicate that an 
instantiated message's format is valid with respect to specification y and that the values of the message 
are valid-all of the required fields as mandated by the specification y for the message are present and 
the values contained in the fields arc correct. Finally, two functions are defined to unify instantiations of 
components, inputs, outputs, and transactions implemented by an application. The operation Ti{z.c!) 
def ines  the  se t  o f  t r ansac t ions  implemented  by  the  ins tan t ia ted  component  d .  This  ed lows  the  se t  Ti{z )  
to be written as the expression shown in Equation 3.12. The operation defines the set of 
input output pairs for an implemented transaction t' with respect to an implemented component d Emd 
can be written as the expression shown in Equation 3.13. 
B{z)  =  {[t'.o'] !  i '  6 I i { z )  and  d  6 Oi{z)} (3.11) 
Tt{z )  =  { f  i t '  €  Ti {z , c ' ) ,  Vc' € C,(z )}  (3.12) 
Prp^,At',c') = {[«',o'] I 3m' 6 such that (o = m' AND c' e Mi^{m))  OR (3.13) 
(t = m' AND c' 6 Af/p(m'))} 
The relationship of the implementation z to a given specification y begins by defining the operation 
Ci{z,y), which is used to determine the set of all components instantiated by implementation z with 
respect to specification y as shown in Equation 3.14. When the set is empty, the implementation does not 
implement any component described by the specification. If Ct{z, y) is not empty, then a relationship 
between the specification y and T[{z) exists and can be expressed as shown in Equation 3.15. It 
should be noted the intersection operator, n, in Equation 3.14 and Equation 3.15 is performing the 
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intersection on two different types of sets: the abstract set of components/transactions specified by 
y and the set of components/transaction implemented by z. In addition, the intersection operator is 
performing a mapping between the specification z and implementation y. Once the relationship between 
the implementation and specification is established, an instantiation of a test suite can be defined for 
an implementation z with respect to specification y sis shown in Equation 3.16. Equation 3.16 can be 
refined to reficct an instantiation of a test suite for a particular component d of implementation z as 
shown in Equation 3.17. 
Ci{z,y) = {c' I c' € {Cr{z) n C(y))} (3.14) 
rK^,y) = {t'|i'6(r/(2,c')nr(2/)), vc'eC;(2,y)} (3.15) 
St{z,y) = {[i',o'] 1 3t' 6 T[{z,y) such that [i',o'] € Ptp^,^{t',c'), Vc' € Ci(z,y)} (3.16) 
S/(s,c',y) = I 3t' € Ti{z,y) such that [t",o'] 6 f/p,.,(t',c')} (3.17) 
A partitioning of the inst£Lntiation of the test suite can be done based on the required and optional 
functions defined by the specification y. This is similar to the partitioning done for the abstract test 
suite in Equations 3.7-3.10. The partitioning of Ti{z) into required and optioned transactions imple­
mented by application z with respect to specification y, Ti^{z,y) and Ttfj{z. y), respectively, allows the 
instantiation of the test suite to be partitioned. Equations 3.18-3.19 show how the partitions can be 
written as expressions. A ftirther refinement to Equations 3.18-3.19 can be done that allows for the 
proposed framework to focus an instantiated test suite on a particular component d of implementation 
z. Equations 3.20-3.21 show how the refined partitions can be written as expressions. 
Si„{z,y) = {[i',o'] 1 3t' € r/„(z,y) such that [i',o'] € P/p_(t',c'), Vc' 6 CKz,y)} (3.18) 
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sioi^iV) = {[i'.o'] i 3t' € Tio{z,y) such that [i',o'\ e P/p..,(t',c'), Vc' e C/(z,y)} (3.19) 
The development of a test suite using the proposed structured framework is done in two parts. First, 
the abstract test suite can be developed based on a specification of an application without specific 
implementation information. Once some implementation information of the specified application is 
known, an instance of the test suite can be derived and implemented. The proposed freunework can be 
used to express properties a test suite may wish to demonstrate. For example, the test suite may wish to 
demonstrate an implementation of an application conforms to a particular specification. A instantiation 
of a conformance test suite can be expressed by modifying Equation 3.18 as shown in Equation 3.22 and 
using Equation 3.19. Equation 3.23 states that an instance of a test suite which is used to determine 
if an implementation z conforms to specification y should contain the input-output peiirs for all the 
transactions required by the specification, CS[^{z,y), and only the optional trzinsactions implemented 
by the appUcation being tested, 5/o {z,y)- Using the notation for the attributes of an abstract message, 
more information about the instantiation of a conformance test can be expressed. Equations 3.19 
and 3.22 can be modified to indicate that valid and invalid input formats of the transactions can be 
included and are shown in Equations 3.24 and 3.25, respectively. This results in the instantiation of 
the conformance test suite of Equation 3.23 to include input-output pairs that contain messages with 
valid and invalid formats. An example of the framework being applied to MISPC is given in the next 
section to demonstrate how the framework can be used to derive an abstract test siiite. 
= {[f',o'] I 3t' € Ti^(z,y) such that [i'.o'J 6 (3.20) 
5;o(2,c',y) = {[i',o'] I Vt' 6 Tio(z,y) such that [i',o'] € ^'/p„„.(t',c')} (3.21) 
CSi^(2, y) = {[i', o'] I [i', of] € (f, d), Vt' 6 (2, y), Vc' 6 C,(z, y)} (3.22) 
CSr{z,y) = {[t',o'] | [i'.o'] 6 [C5f„(i:,y) U 5/o(z,y)]} (3.23) 
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Sioi-^.y) = I 3[t',o'] 6 Pw(t'.c'), 
Vi' 6 T[^{z,y), Vc' 6 C[{z,y) such that 
i'.validformatiy) o-ud i'.invalidformat(y)} 
(3.24) 
CSi^(z,y) = {[i'.o'] I 3fi',o'l € P/p_(t',c'). 
Vt' e Ti^(z,y), Vc/ € Ci{z,y) such that 
i'.validformativ) and i'.invalidformativ)} 
(3.25) 
Application of the Proposed Structured Framework to the MISPC 
The proposed framework will be applied to the specification of the X'lISPC that was described in 
Chapter 2. This example demonstrates how the proposed framework is used in the development of 
a test suite. In Chapter 4. an instantiation of a test suite for an implementation of a Certificate 
Authority (CA) component specified by the MISPC will be created using the resiUts from this section. 
The proposed framework steirts by defining the basic sets which will be used to define the abstract test 
suite for the MISPC, S(\nSPC). The set of components and transactions. C(NnSPC) and T(MISPC) 
respectively, are enumerated by the MISPC. The elements of the C(MISPC) consist of the Certificate 
Authority (CA), Organization Registration Authority (ORA), Certificate Holder (CH). Client (CL), 
cind Repository (REP) and can be written as the expression shown in Equation 3.26. 
The proposed framework defines the set of transactions, T(MISPC), using the MISPC. The MISPC 
defines the following transactions: certificate requests by a CH (selLregistration), certificate requests us­
ing an ORA (orajregistration), certificate requests using a PKCS#10 request message (pkcslO-registration), 
renewal of certificates (certrenewal), the retrieval and posting of certificates cind CRL (certretrieval, 
cert-post, crLretrieval, crLpost), the generation and vahdation of signatures (signature.validation, sig-
nature-generation), and vahdation of certifcate paths (path-validation). The set T(MISPC) can be 
written as the expression shown in Equation 3.27. The MISPC defines the messages that make up the 
12 transactions both formally using ASN.l and informally using an English language description. The 
transactions that have messages defined formally using ASN.l are: orajegistration, certjrevocation. 
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self-registration, certjrenewal, and pkcslO-registration. The ASN.l defined data structures for the 
messages used by these transactions are shown in Figures 2.5-2.14. The orajregistration transactions 
include the following messages: a certificate request message from CH to the ORA (ch_ora.cr), a cer­
tificate request message from ORA to CA (ora-ca.cr), a certificate reply message from CA to ORA 
(ca.ora-cp), and optionally a certificate reply message from CA to CH (ca.ch.cp). The rest of the 
transactions consist of two ASN.l defined messages: a transaction request and reply message. The 
cert .revocation transaction consists of a revocation request and reply message, rr and rp respectively. 
The selfjegistration transaction consists of a certificate request and reply message, selLcr and self.cp 
respectively. The cert-renewal transaction consists of a certificate renewal request and reply message, 
renewal.cr and reneweil-cp respectively. The pkcslO-registration consists of a pkcs#10 certificate request 
and reply message, pkcslO.cr and pkcslO.cp respectively. The transactions that have messages implic­
itly defined are: cert.retrieval, crlj-etreival, cert.post, crLpost, path-validation, signature.validation, 
and signature.generation. The signature.validation transaction consists of a signed message or certifi­
cate (signed_mess-s and signed.cert.s, respectively) and the result of the validation (signjesult). The 
path.vaIidation trsmsaction consists of a signed message or certificate (signedjness.p and signed.cert.p, 
respectively) and the result of the validation (pathjresult). The signature-generation transaction con­
sists of an unsigned message or certificate (unsigned-mess and unsigned_cert, respectively) and the re­
sulting signed message or certificate (signed mess-g and signed-cert.g, respectively). The cert-retrival, 
crlj'etrival, cert-post, and crLpost transactions are also not addressed using ASN.l by the MISPC 
and involve the repository which the specification does not completely describe. The cert-retrieval and 
crLretrieval transactions consist of a retrieval request message (cert-query and crLquery, respectively) 
and retrieval reply message (cert-query-reply and crLquery-reply, respectively). The cert-post and 
crLpost transactions can be asynchronous and synchronous in nature. If the cert.post and crLpost trans­
actions are asynchronous in nature, they consist of a single message (cert.post-mess and crLpost-mess, 
respectively). If the cert-post and crLpost transactions are synchronous in nature, they consist of two 
messages: a post request message (cert.post jeq and crLpost-req, respectively) and post reply mes­
sages (cert-post.rep and crLpost-rep, respectively). The sets of messages for all the transactions can 
be written as the expressions shown in Equations 3.28-Equations 3.41. 
C{MISPC) = {CA,ORA,CH,CL,REP} (3.26) 
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T{MISPC] = {ora.regi3tration,cert.revocation, self .registration, 
cert.renewal. pkcsl0.registration, cert.retrieval, (3.27) 
cr I.retrieval, cert.post, crLpost, pathjvalidation, 
signature.validation, signature.generation} 
TM{ora.regi3tration) = {CH.ORA.CR U ORA.CA.CR U CAJDRA.CP U CA.CH.CP) (3.28) 
TM{cert.revocation) = {RR U RP) (3.29) 
TM{self .registration) = {SELF.CRU SELF.CP) (3.30) 
TM{ceH.renevjal) = {RENEWAL.CR U RENEW AL.CP) (3.31) 
T\f{pkcsl0.registration) = {PKCSIO.CR U PKCSIO.CP) (3.32) 
TMicert-retrieval) = {CEBT.QUERY U CERT.QUERYJtEPLY) (3.33) 
TM{crLretrieual) = {CRL.QUERY U CRL.QUERYJiEPLY) (3.34) 
TM ipath.validation) = {SIGNED JdESSJ* U SIGNED.CERTJ* U PATH JtESULT) (3.35) 
TM {signature.validation) = {SIGNED.MESS^USIGNED.CERTJSL>SIGN JtESULT) (3.36) 
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TSI {signature.generation) = {UNSIGNED^ESS UUNSIGNED.CERTU (3.37) 
SIGNEDMESS.G U SIGNED.CERT.G) 
TMICERTJPOSTAAYNCHRONOUA) = CEBT .POST JVL ESS (3.38) 
TMICRL.POSTAAYNCHRONOUA) = CRLJ'OST .M ESS (3.39) 
TM(ceTt.post,y„chronous) = {CERTJ'OSTJLEQU CERTJ'OSTJIEP) (3.40) 
TM(crl .postsynchronoM,) = {€RLJ*OST JiEQ U CRLJ>OSTJiEP) (3.41) 
The proposed framework will continue to be applied to the MISPC but will focus on the CA com­
ponent because it is the component for which an instantiation of the abstract test suite will be imple­
mented in Chapter 4. Applying the proposed framework similarly to the ORA, CH, CL components 
of the MISPC would allow an abstract test suite to be developed for them which can be combined 
to form a complete abstract test suite for an MISPC system. The proposed framework allows for the 
abstract test suite for the CA component to be written as the expression in Equation 3.42 which is a 
modification of Equation 3.6. Equation 3.42 shows that the abstract test suite for the CA component 
can be partitioned into test suites for the required and optional transactions/functionedity defined by 
the MISPC, SR{MISPC,CA) and So{MISPC,CA), respectively. Of the two abstract test suites, 
So{MISPC.CA) provides a better initial starting point than SR{MISPC,CA). SO{MISPC,CA) 
is the set of input-output pairs for all optional transactions of the CA component and is shown in 
Equation 3.43. The set of optional transactions for the CA component, To{MISPC,CA), consists of 
the pkcslOjregistration and can be written as the expression shown in Equation 3.44. Using Equa­
tion 3.44, So{MISPC, CA) can be simplified to the expression shown in Equation 3.45. The message 
operations Mc(m) and Mp(m) can be applied to the messages, pkcslO.cr and pkcslO.cp, which make 
up the pkcslOjregistration transaction and are shown in Equation 3.46. Equation 3.46 demonstrates 
that a CA must be able to generate a pkcsl0.cp message as output and accept pkcslO.cr message as 
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input. The MISPC further states that if a CA is presented a pkcslO.cr message, it should generate a 
pkcsl0.cp message. This results in the input-output pairs shown in Equation 3.47 and can be used to 
simplify So{MISPC,CA) to the expression shown in Equation 3.48. 
S(MISPC, CA) = SR(MISPC, CA) U So{MISPC, CA) (3.42) 
So{MISPC, CA) = {[i, o] I [i, o] € PpaiAt, CA), Vt e To{MISPC, CA)} (3.43) 
To(,MISPC,CA) = {pkc310.registration} (3.44) 
So{MISPC,CA) = {[i,o] I [z,o] e Ppairipl'cslQjregistrationyCA)} (3.45) 
CA 6 McipkcalO.cp) => o 6 (MQ^{CA) r\TM{pkcsl0.registration)) (3.46) 
CA 6 Mp{pkcsl0.cT) => i € {Mp^(CA) nTM^pkcslOj-egistration)) 
Ppair(pkcsl0.registratian,CA) = {[t,oj j i 6 PKCSIO.CR AND o e PKCSiO.CP} (3.47) 
So {MISPC, CA) = PKCSIO.CR x PKCSIO.CP (3.48) 
In a similar fashion, the abstract test suite for the required transactions, SR{MISPC,CA), of an 
MISPC CA component can be derived. Sii{MISPC, CA) is the set of input-output pairs for all required 
transactions of the CA component zmd is shown in Equation 3.49. The set of required transactions for 
the CA component, TR{MISPC,CA), consists of orajregistration, cert-revocation, self-registration, 
cert.renewal, cert.post, and crLpost which can be written as the expression shown in Equation 3.50. 
Using Equation 3.50, So{MISPC,CA) can be rewritten as to the expression shown in Equation 3.51. 
Applsring the message operations, Mcijn) and Mp{m), to the messages (shown in Equation 3.28) used 
by the orajregistration tranaction results in the expressions shown in Equation 3.52. Equation 3.52 
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demonstrates that a CA mi^t be able to generate ca-ora.cp and ca.ch.cp messages as output and accept 
ora-ca.cr messages as input. The MISPC states that if a CA receives an ora.ca.cr message, it should 
respond with ca-ora.cp and possibly a ca_ch_cp message and this results in the set of input-output pairs 
shown by Equation 3.53^. 
SR{MISPC,CA) = {[i,o) I [i,o] e PPAIRIT,CA), \ft € TR(MISPC,CA)} (3.49) 
T/j(A/ISPC, CA) = {ora.registration, cert.revocation, set/.registration, (3.50) 
cert.renewal, cert.post, crl.post} 
SR^MISPC.CA) = {[i.o] I [i,o] e PPAIR(ora.registration. CA) U 
PpaiT(cert.revocation,CA) U Ppatr(self.registration.CA) U (3.51) 
Ppair{cert.renewl,CA) U Ppair{cert.post,CA) U 
Ppair{crLpOSt, CA)} 
CA € Mo{ca.ora.cp) ^ o e (Mj^(CA) n TM(ora.registration)) 
CA 6 Moica-chjcp') =>• o 6 {MQ^{CA) riTM(ora.registration)) (3.52) 
CA 6 Mp{oTa.cajcr) =» i 6 (Mp^{CA) nTuiorci-registration)) 
Ppairipro-fegistration^CA) = {[i,o] | i 6 ORA.CA.CR AND (3.53) 
o € CA.ORA.CP U CA.CH.CP} 
Applying the message operations to the messages (shown in Equation 3.29) used by the cert ^ revocation 
transaction results in the expressions shown in Equation 3.54. Equation 3.54 demonstrates that a CA 
indicates that the input-output is optional. 
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must be able to generate rp messages as output and accept rr messages as input. The MISPC states 
that if a CA receives an rr message, it should respond with an rp message and this results in the set of 
input output pairs shown by Equation 3.55. 
CA e Mo(rp) => o 6 (MQ^(CA) fl TM{cert.revocation)) (3.54) 
CA e Mp{rr) =>• o 6 (Mp'(C-4) fl TM^cert.revocation)) 
Ppair{cert.revocati<m,CA) = {[i,o| | i € RR AND o € RP] (3.55) 
Applying the message operations to the messages (shown in Equation 3.30) used by the self j'egistration 
transaction results in the expressions shown in Equation 3.56. Equation 3.56 demonstrates that a CA 
must be able to generate self.cp messages as output and accept self.cr messages as input. The XIISPC 
states that if a CA receives a self.cr message, it should respond with a self.cp message and results in 
the set of input-output pairs shown by Equation 3.57. 
CA € Mciself-cp) ^ 0 6  {MQ^{CA) nTM(sel/.registration)) (3.56) 
CA e Mp{self.cr) ^ t 6 {Mp^{CA) HTM{self.registration)) 
Ppair(self .registration, CA) = {[i,o] | i € SELF.CR AND o € SELF.CP} (3.57) 
Applying the message operations to the messages (shown in Equation 3.31) used by the cert renewal 
transaction results in the expressions shown in Equation 3.58. Equation 3.58 demonstrates that a CA 
must be able to generate renewaLcp messages as output and accept renewal.cr messages as input. The 
MISPC states that if a CA receives a renewaLcr message, it should respond with a renewaLcp message 
and results in the set of input-output pairs shown by Equation 3.59. 
CA € Ma{renewal.cp) ^ o 6 {M^^{CA) n Tificert.renewal)) (3.58) 
CA 6 Mp{renewed.cr) =>i s {Mp^{CA) n T),{{cert.renewal)) 
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PpatAcert.renewal, CA) = {[i,ol | i 6 RENEWAL.CR AND o 6 RENEWAL.CP} (3.59) 
The cert.post and crLpost transactions can either be asynchronous or synchronous in nature. Apply­
ing the message operations to the messages (shown in Equation 3.38) used by the cert.postasynchronous 
transaction results in the expressions shown in Equation 3.60. Equation 3.60 demonstrates that a CA 
must be able to generate cert.post jness messages as output; however, the MISPC does not state under 
what conditions a CA should post a certificate. This results in a set of input-output pairs shown in 
Equation 3.61 which is not completely specified. The 7 is used to indicate that an unknown input is 
used to generate the cert.post jness. If the cert.post transaction is synchronous in nature, applying 
the message operations to the messages (shown in Equation 3.40) used by cert.postaynchronaus results 
in the expressions shown in Equation 3.62. Equation 3.62 demonstrates that a CA must be able to 
generate cert.post jeq message as output and accept a cert.post jep messages as input. Again, the 
X'lISPC does not state under what conditions a CA should post a certificate which results in a set of 
input-output pairs shown in Equation 3.63 which is not completely specified. The 7 is used to indicate 
that em unknown input is used to generate the cert.post jeq. The K is used to indicate that an imknown 
output is produced when the CA is given a cert.postjep message. 
CA e MG{certjpost.mess) => o € {MQ^{CA) nT\t{ceTt.posta3ynckrontms)) (3.60) 
Ppair(.C£rt.pOStaaynchronou3,CA) = {[i.o] | I = 7 AND o 6 CERTJ'OSTJ4ESS} (3.61) 
CA 6 MG{ceTtjpostjreq) =>o e (MQ'^(CA) n Tm (cert.post synchronous)) (3.62) 
CA 6 Mp{certjpost.rep) => i 6 (,Mp^{CA) n Tm (cert.post synchronous)) 
Ppair(cert.postsynchronaus,CA) = {[i,ol | I 6 (7 U CERTJ*OSTJiEP) AND (3.63) 
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o e [CERTJ'OSTJiEQ U «)} 
Applying the message operations to the messages (shown iD Equation 3.39) used by the 
crl.postaaynchTonaua transaction results in the expressions shown in Equation 3.64. Equation 3.64 demon­
strates that a CA must be able to generate crLpostjness messages as output; however, the MISPC does 
not state under what conditions a CA should post a CRL. This results in a set of input -output pairs 
shown in Equation 3.65 which is not completely specified. Again, 7 is used to indicate that an un­
known input is used to generate the crLpost jmess. If the crLpost transaction is synchronous in nature, 
applying the message operations to the messages (shown in Equation 3.41) used by crl.po3t,ynehrmous 
results in the expressions shown in Equation 3.66. Equation 3.66 demonstrates that a CA must be 
able to generate a crLpost jreq message as output and accept a crLpost-rep messages as input. Again, 
the \QSPC does not state under what conditions a CA should post a CRL which results in a set of 
input-output pairs shown in Equation 3.67 which is not completely specified. The 7 is used to indicate 
that an unknown input is used to generate the crLpost-req. The K is used to indicate that an unknown 
output is produced when the CA is given a crLpost j:ep message. 
CA e MG{CTI.post.mess) =>• o € {M(J^(CA) R\TM{CRL-POSTAAVNCHRMMA)) (3.64) 
Ppair{cTl.pOStasynchronoua,CA) = {[t,o] | t" = 7 AND 0 €.  CRL J'OSTMESS]} (3.65) 
CA 6 Mc(crl.postjreq) =» O € {MQ^{CA) n TMicert-pOStaaynehronoua)) 
CA € Mp{crLp03tjrep) => Z € {Mp^{CA) n TM^Cert.pOStaaynchrmaua)) 
(3.66) 
Ppair{crl.pOStaynchrmoua^ CA) — {['>"1 | i € (7 CRLJ'OSTJtEP) AND 
O e {CRLJ'OSTJIEQ U «)} 
(3.67) 
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Using the elements from the sets defined in Equations 3.53, 3.55, 3.57, 3.59, 3.61, 3.63, 3.65, and 
3.67, SR{MISPC,CA) can be rewritten as the set of input-output pairs shown in Equation 3.68. 
t indicates that the input-output pairs are only necessary when using the synchronous form of the 
cert-post and crLpost transactions. $ indicates that the input-output pairs are only necessary when 
using the asjmchronous form of the ccrt.post and crLpost transactions. 
SR{MISPC,CA) = {{OR.A.CA.CR x CA.ORA.CP x CA.CH.CP'), 
{SELF.CR X SELF.CP) U (/iiZ x RP) U {RENEWAL.CR x RENEWAL.CP), (3.68) 
(7 X CERTJ'OSTMESS)^ U (7 x CERTJ'OSTJiEQ)^ U CERTJ'OSTJIEP x U 
(7 X CRLJ>OSTMESS)^ U (CRLJ>OSTJtEP x K)^ U (7 x CRLpOSTJlEQy} 
Using Equations 3.68 and 3.48, the overall MISPC CA component abstract test suite of Equa­
tion 3.42 can be rewritten as Equation 3.69. A more descriptive MISPC CA component abstract test 
suite, Smore{^ISPC,CA), can be specified which indicates both valid and invalid abstract message 
formats for inputs to the MISPC CA component are part of the test suite, and it can be written 
as Equation 3.70. The MISPC CA abstract test suite allows the interactions between components 
to be explicitly demonstrated by applying the Maijn) and Mp(ni) operations on the abstract inputs 
and outputs of the input-output peiirs of the test suite. For example, MG(TT] = {ORA.CH} and 
Mp{rp) = {C>1}. for the input-output pair frr.rp] which makes up a certificate revocation transaction, 
shows that a CA receives rr messages from and sends rp messages to ORAs and CHs. This abstract 
test suite of the MISPC CA component derived will be used to derive an instantiation of the test suite 
to be implemented in section 2 of Chapter 4. 
S{MISPC, CA) = {{ORA.CA.CR x CA.ORA.CP x CA.CH.CP') U 
{SELF.CR X SELF.CP) U [RR x ilP) u {RENEWAL.CR x RENEWAL.CP) u 
(7 X CERTJ'OSTMESS)^ U (7 x CERTJ>OSTJtEQ)^ U {CERTJ'OSTJIEP x K)^ U (3.69) 
(7 X CRLJ'OSTJdESS)^ U {CRLJ^OSTJtEP x K)^ u 
(7 X CRLJ'OSTJiEQ)^ U {PKCSIQ.CR x PKCSIQ.CP)} 
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Srr,orrXMISPC,CA) cS{MISPC.CA) AND 
3(i,o) € smore(a//spc, cj4) such that i.invaiidformat(.MISPC) AND (3.70) 
3(i, o) 6 Smorei^ISPCjCA) SUch that i.Valid/armatiMISPC) 
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4 APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK TO THE 
MISPC 
Overview of the MISPC Reference Implementation 
A reference implementation of the MISPC was developed for MIST by CygnaCom Solutions. The 
reference implementation provides a proof of concept for the MISPC by having a working implementa­
tion of a Certificate Authority (CA), Orgajiization Registration Authority (ORA), and Client based on 
the specification. Both the source and executable codes for the components implemented were provided, 
as well £is a simple stand-alone application which generates and verifies signatures. The components of 
the reference Implementation can operate together as a PKI by adding a repository service application 
that uses the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) to store issued certificates and certificate 
revocation lists (CRLs), an e-mail server to transport MISPC messages, and the use of a floppy disk 
to transport out-of-bound information (such as shared secrets) between components. An overview of 
the configuration of this MISPC PKI implementation can be seen in Figure 4.1. The subject to be 
exercised by the test suite developed from the newly proposed framework will be the CA component 
of the MISPC reference implementation. This section will provide a technical description of how the 
various components of the MISPC reference implementation were implemented [12]. This will pro­
vide the backgroimd needed to understand the following test suite implementation issues which will be 
described later in this chapter: how the test suite subject differs from the original MISPC reference 
implementation of the component, how the test suite will interface with its test subject, and where the 
perimeter of the test suite is located. 
The components of the reference implementation were specifically designed to run on personal com­
puters with a TCP/IP network connection running the Windows 95 operating system. The primary 
programming language used to implement the MISPC components was C+-t-: however, C was used 
to implement some of the underlying functions used by the components. In addition to C/C-r+, the 
following development libraries were used: Microsoft Foundation Class (MFC), Object Linking and 
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CA ORA CLIENT 
Repository 
Repository E-mail Server 
Operator Operator 
Figure 4.1 MISPC Reference Implementation PKI Configuration. 
Embedding (OLE), and Component Object Model (COM) [40, 33, 6, 34]. The MFC library offers a 
framework for developing an application by providing a collection of C++ classes for Graphical User 
Interfaces (GUIs), input devices, message handlers, etc. OLE is a set of standards for building software 
components that are connectable. The standard used to define interfaces that allow for connections 
between OLE components is the COM specification. The COM interfaces allow for connections to be 
made between different applications with OLE components on the same or different hosts (i.e. inter­
process conmiimication) as well as OLE components within a single application. Another important 
feature of OLE components is that a component can set and obtain variables that it uses by registering 
itself and the variables in the system registry. The system registry stores system-wide state informa­
tion for the Windows operating system (95, NT, and 3.1). Typically, an OLE component will register 
configuration variables such as directory paths, host names, IP addresses, user names, etc. The reg­
istered variables can be modified by an application program that uses the system registry application 
programming interface (API). One stand-alone program that interfaces with the system registry API 
is REGEDIT.EXE. REGEDIT.EXE is able to access and display the entries of the system registry and 
is provided with the standard installation of a Microsoft Windows operation system. REGEDIT.EXE 
allows a user to manually inspect and modify entries of the system registry. 
One or more of the MISPC reference implementation components uses the following libraries in 
the form of Dynamically Linked Libraries (DLLs) or OLE components in the form of an OLE control: 
gcs.dll\ certific.dll, sldap32.dll, certpath.dll, CygnaComSMTP.dll, and CygnaComPOP3.dll. These 
libraries provide services required for the components of the MISPC reference implementation and will 
^The source code for this DLL was not provided for distribution with the MISPC reference implementation due to 
U.S. Government Export Control Regulations. 
59 
be reviewed individually. 
The gcs.dll is a DLL based on the Generic Cryptographic Services (GCS) standard and provides 
the cryptographic functionedity required by the different components of the MISPC reference imple­
mentation. The GCS standard provides cryptographic services to applications by defining a standard 
API for cryptographic services such as providing confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of data [32]. 
The GCS DLL provides data integrity for the components of the MISPC reference implementation by 
using the Standard Hashing Algorithm (SHA-1) and Data Encryption Stfmdard-Message Authentica­
tion Code (DES-MAC). For data authentication, the GCS DLL uses the Digital Signature Algorithm 
(DSA) public key crjrptographic system. The GCS DLL stores the private keys in an encrypted format 
and requires authentication to access the keys. 
The certific32.dll provides the Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.l) elements reqxiired by all 
components of the MISPC reference implementation. In addition to specifying data structures using a 
well defined notation, ASN.l specifies how the data structures should be represented when translated 
into streams of bytes [37). The certific32.dll defines specific C data structures for the ASN.l data 
structures specified by the MISPC. In addition, it provides the functions to encode and decode the 
defined C data structures following the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) specified by ASN.l. 
The CygnaComSMTP.dll and CygnaComPOP3.dll provide the transport mechanism used to ex­
change MISPC-defined PKI messages between the components of the reference implementation. The 
MISPC reference implementation was designed to transport PKI messages as Multipurpose Internet 
Mail Exchange (MI^'IE) encoded attachments of electronic mail (e-mail) messages. MIME encoding 
specifies how e-mail messages should be formatted to minimize the possibility that their contents (for 
example images, audio, executable code, etc.) will be corrupted as they are transported through dif­
ferent e-mail systems [15]. The CygnaComSMTP.dll is used to send the e-mail messages generated by 
the components to an e-mail server. Similarly, CygnaComPOP3.dll is used to retrieve e-mail messages 
for a component firom an e-mail server. 
The certpath.dll is only used by the simple st£uid-alone application that generates and verifies 
signatures [11]. Given a list of certificates (or certificate chain), the DLL verifies that a vaHd chain of 
certificates exists between a certificate issued by a CA trusted by the verifier and a certificate used to 
generate a valid signature. For example, CAl is trusted by the verifier but CA 2 is not directly trusted 
by the verifier. If CAl issues a certificate to CA2, then a valid certificate path could exisit between the 
verifier and a signature generated using a certificate issued by CA2. The act of CAl issuing a certificate 
to CA2 implies that CAl trusts CA2. The result is that the verifier will trust certificates issued by CA2 
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because CAl trusts CA2. 
Finally, the sldap32.dll provides the MISPC reference implementation components with the func­
tionality to access repositories in order to search, retrieve, £ind post certificates and CRLs. The DLL uses 
the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) to access repositories as specified by the MISPC. 
In Figure 4.2, the integration of the previously described DLLs as well as two executables, Manage-
mentApp.exe and TransProc.exe, shows how the CA component of the MISPC reference implementation 
is formed. The ManagementApp.exe application is launched by the operator of the CA [8]. It provides 
a GUI to the CA component which allows an operator to set configuration variables, provide authenti­
cation information to access the CA's private keys, add ORAs which it has certified, and create, start, 
and stop instantiations of the CA's transaction processor (TransProc.exe). The ManagementApp.exe 
interacts with TransProc.exe by OLE-COM interfaces that begin and halt it, presents it with DER en­
coded PKI messages for processing, and returns either a DER encoded PKI message or an error message 
as a result of processing a PKI message. The certific32.dll provides the DER encoding eind decoding 
functionality required by the transaction processor to generate find parse PKI messages. The transac­
tion processor uses the sldap32.dll to interact with a repository as it issues, revokes, and searches for 
certificates eind CRLs. To exchange DER encoded PKI messages between other MISPC components, 
the ManagementApp.exe uses the CygnaComSMTP.dll and CygnaComPOP3.dll to interact with £in 
e-mail server. Finally, the ManagementApp.exe creates and manages a loc«d database (powered by 
Microsoft Access using the OLE module for Access) of keys it has certified. 
CA 
Operator 
ManagementApp.exe 
TransProc.exe 
I certlfic32.dii| 
CygnaCom 
STMP.dll 
GCS.dll I I 8ldap32.dll I 
CyganCom 
P0P3.dll 
To 
Crypto-Token 
To 
Repoeitory 
To 
E-Mail Server 
Figure 4.2 Overview of the MISPC Reference Implementation CA. 
61 
The ORA and Client components of the MISPC reference implementation are formed by the inte­
gration of the aforementioned DLLs which are shown in Figure 4.3. The code executed by the ORA 
and Client components are the exact stime except for the GUI, which is presented to an operator of the 
component. The installMode variable entry found in the registry in the HKEY_LOCAL_A'IACHINE\-
SOFTWARE\CYGNACOM SOLUTIONS, INC\NIST\ORA folder is set to a zero for the Ghent GUI 
to be presented and to a one for the ORA GUI. These GUIs provide the operator with the means to 
set configuration vziriables, present authentication information to access the components private keys, 
and request PKI transactions to be performed [9, 10]. The ORA and Client components generate and 
process DER encoded PKI messages with the help of the certific32.dll. To search for certificates or 
CRLs, the ORA and Client components use the sldap32.dll to interact with repository service appU-
cations. The ORA and Client components exchange DER encoded PKI messages with other i/IISPC 
components by using the CygnaComSMTP.dll to interact with an e-mail server. However, the ORA and 
Client components do not receive PKI messages directly from an e-mail server. A stand-alone e-mail 
client is used by both to retrieve e-mail messages which contain the MIME attached PKI messages. 
Once the e-mail messages containing the PKI messages are downloaded to the host system, the ORA 
and Client components process the MIME attachments containing the PKI messages. 
ORA/CUENT 
ORA.exe - CUENT.exe 
GCS.dll CygnaCom STMP.dll 
I sldao^dll I I certific32.dii| 
To To To 
Crypto-Token Repository g-Mail Server 
Figure 4.3 Overview of the MISPC Reference Implementation ORA and 
Client. 
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Test Suite Instantiation for the MISPC Reference Implementation CA Com­
ponent 
An instantiation of a test suite for the CA component of the MISPC will be derived for implemen­
tation based on the abstract test stiite derived in Section 3 of Chapter 3 and the specific details of the 
MISPC reference implementation of the CA component presented in the previous section. In general, 
the proposed framework begins to instantiate a test suite by describing an implementation of an appli­
cation as the set of input-output pairs that it generates, as previously shown in Equation 3.11. Using 
Equation 3.11, the MISPC reference implementation of the CA component application, CAref, can be 
written as Equation 4.1. The proposed framework continues to describe an application by determining 
the set of transactions instantiated by em implementation of an application, as previously shown m 
Equation 3.12. Using Equation 3.12, the set of transactions instantiated by CAref can be written as 
Equation 4.2. Because CAref only implements the CA component of the MISPC, Equation 4.2 can be 
simplified to Equation 4.3. An enumeration of the set of CA transactions implemented by CAref can 
be expressed by simplifying Equation 4.2 as shown in Equation 4.4. 
B(CAref} = {[i', o'] I i' € I,{.CAref)  and o' e Oi(CAref)} (4.1) 
T[{CAref)  = [ f  I t '  6 Ti(CAref.  c ) ,  Vc' € Ci{CAref)} (4.2) 
TliCAref)  = {f 11'  e Tr(CAref.CA')} (4.3) 
Ti(CAref)  = T[{CAref,CA')  = {oTa-registratioTi', cert.revocation', Self .registration', (4.4) 
certjrenevial', cert.post', crLpost/} 
Once the specifics of an implementation of an application are expressed by the proposed framework, 
the relationship between the implementation and a specification can be demonstrated. The proposed 
framework begins by determining the relationship between components implemented by an application 
and the components described by a specification using Equation 3.14. The implementation of CAref 
only instantiates the CA component described by the MISPC and can be expressed as Equation 4.5. 
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Because of the relationship that exists between CAref and the MISPC, Equation 3.15 can be used to 
demonstrate a relationship between Tj[CAref) and the MISPC and is shown in Equation 4.6. 
The instantiation of the abstract test suite, S [{CAref, MISPC), can be expressed based on Equa­
tion 3.16. Equation 3.16 can be simplified because Ci{CAref, MISPC) contains a single element and 
can be rewritten as shown in Equation 4.7. The framework will allow S[{CAref, MISPC) to be par­
titioned based on the required and optional transactions instantiated by CAref, T{{CArr.f.MISPC). 
The partitioning of Ti{CAref, MISPC) into the required and optional transactions implemented by 
CAref, Ti„{CAref, MISPC) tind TioiCAref, MISPC) are shown in Equations 4.8 and 4.9, respec­
tively. Because the set of TidCAref, MISPC) is empty, Si{CAref, MISPC) degenerates into the 
instantiation of the test suite for the required transactions, S[„{CAref, MISPC). A simplification of 
S[(CAref, MISPC) can be made using Equations 4.7 and 4.8 2ind is shown in Equation 4.10. The set 
of messages instantiated for use by the instantiated transactions of CAref, shown in Equation 4.10, can 
be written as the expressions in Equations 4.11-4.16. 
SiiCAref,MISPC) = {[z',o'] I 3t' € T[{CAref.MISPC) such that [i',o'\ 6 Pir^,At',CA')} (4.7) 
CfiCAref,  MISPC) = C[{CAref)  H C{MISPC) = CA' (4.5) 
T[ {CAref,  MISPC) = T[ {CAref)  H T{MISPC) = 
{ara.registraticn'^ cert.revocation', self .registration', 
cert.renewal', certjpost' ,crl.post'} 
(4.6) 
T[^{CAref,  MISPC) = T[{CAref)  h TR{MISPC) = 
{orajregistratian , certjrevocation', self .registration', 
cert.renewal', cert.posif, crl.post'} 
(4.8) 
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Ti^ {CAref,  MISPC) = {0} (4.9) 
Si{CAref,  MISPC) = {[i',o'] I [x',o'] 6 Pip^,^{ora.regi3trati(m',CA')  U 
Prp^,^{cert.revocation',CA') U Pip^,^{aelf.registration',CA') U (4.10) 
Pi(cert.renewal', CA') U Pip{cert.post',CA') U Pip^^^(crLpost',CA')} 
TIN,{ora.regi3tration') = {CH.ORA.CR' U ORAJCA.CR') (4-11) 
TI^ {cert.revocation') = {RR' U RP") (4.12) 
TIN, {self.registration') = {SELF.CR' U SELF.CP') (4.13) 
TIN, {cert.renewal') = {RENEWAL.CR' U RENEWAL.CP') (4.14) 
TI^ {CERT.POST',,^^,^,^^^) = CEBTJ>OSTJDESS' (4.1-5) 
TI,, = CRLJ>OSTMESS' (4.16) 
The instantiated message operations Mta{m') and Mip{m') are applied to the messages that make 
up the orajregistratian' transaction and are shown in Equation 4.17. Equation 4.17 demonstrates that 
the CAref is capable of generating a ca.ara.cp' message as output and accepting an ara.ca.CT' message 
as input. Using Equation 4.5 and what is stated about a CA in the MISPC, if the CAref is presented an 
ara.cajcr' message, it should generate a ca.ora.cp' message. The resulting input-output instantiated 
pair is shown in Equation 4.18. 
CA' € Mic;{ca.ora.cp') ^  o' e (M^^(CA) r\TM{ora.registration')) (4.17) 
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CA' 6 Mip{ora.ca.cr') => i' e {MjJ{CA) n TM(ora.registration'))nonumbeT 
Pip.,Aora.regi3tratitm',CA') = {[i'.ol | i' € ORA.CA.CR' AND o' € CA.ORA.CP'] (4.18) 
Applying the instantiated message operations to the messages used by the cert.revocation' trans­
action (shown in Equation 4.12) results in the expression shown in Equation 4.19. Equation 4.19 
demonstrates that the CAref is capable of generating rp' messages as output and accepting rr' mes­
sages as input. Using Equation 4.5 and what is stated about a CA in the MISPC, if the CAref is 
presented a rr' message, it should generate a rp' message. The resulting input-output instantiated pair 
is shown in Equation 4.20. 
Appljdng the instantiated message operations to the messages used by the self .registration' trans­
action (shown in Equation 4.13) results in the expression shown in Equation 4.21. Equation 4.21 
demonstrates that the CAref is capable of generating self.cpf messages as output and accepting self.cr' 
messages as input. Using Equation 4.5 and what is stated about a CA in the MISPC, if the CAref 
is presented a self-cr' message, it should generate a selfjcp' message. The resulting input-output 
instantiated pair is shown in Equation 4.22. 
CA' e Miair-p') => o' 6 {Mi^{CA) n TM^certjrevocation')) 
CA' 6 M[p{rr') ^  i' € {Mfp{CA) nTM{cert.revocation')) 
(4.19) 
Ptp^,Acert.revocati(m',CA') = \i' £RR' AND o' € RP') (4.20) 
CA' € Mtc{self.cp') ^ o' e {Mj^{CA) nTM{selfjregistration')) 
CA' € Mip{selfxr') => i' € (MfJ^{CA) HTM^self.registration')) 
(4.21) 
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(.self.regi3tratiem\ CA') = {[i', o'] (i' £ SELF.CR' AND o' € SELF.CP'} (4.22) 
Applying the instantiated message operations to the messages used by the ceTt.renewal' transaction 
(shown in Equation 4.14) results in the expression shown in Equation 4.23. Equation 4.23 demonstrates 
that the CAre/ is capable of generating renewal.cp' messages as output and accepting renewal.cr' 
messages as input. Using Equation 4.5 and what is stated about a CA in the MISPC, if the CAref is 
presented a renewaLcr' message, it should generate a renewal^cp' message. The resulting input-output 
instantiated pair is shown in Equation 4.24. 
CA' € MidirenewaLcp') => o' € {M[J{CA) PI T\i{cert.renewal')) (4.23) 
CA' € Mtp{renewal.cr') => i' 6 [MfJ^(CA) DTM{cert.renewal')) 
PiP^.Acert.renewal', CA') = {[i', o'] | i' € RENEWAL.CR' AND o' € RENEWAL.CP'} (4.24) 
Applying the instantiated message operations to the messages used by the cert.post' transaction 
(shown in Equation 4.15) results in the expression shown in Equation 4.25. Equation 4.25 demonstrates 
that the CArsf is capable of generating cert.post.mess' messages as output. The MISPC does not 
address the questions of when a cert.post.mess' message should be generated, which leads to the use of 
an unknown input, 7', being used to indicate that some input is required to cause the cert.post.mess' 
message to be generated. The resiilting input-output instantiated pair is shown in Equation 4.26. 
When applying the instantiated message operations to the messages used by the crl.post' transaction 
(shown in Equation 4.16), a similar result occurs as demonstrated by Equations 4.27 and 4.28. Using 
the Equations 4.18, 4.20, 4.22, 4.24, 4.26, and 4.28, Equation 4.10 can be simplified to the expression 
shown in Equation 4.29. The [7', cert.post.mess'] and [7', crl.post.mess'] elements can be eliminated 
&om the instantiated test suite because the undefined input make it impossible for the test suite to 
generate the input. The result is a further simplification of Equation 4.29 to the expression shown in 
Equation 4.30. 
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CA' € M{a{cert.post.mess') => o' € {MjJiCA) n TM{cert.post'^^y„^f^^^^,)) (4.25) 
Pip... CA') = {[«', o'\ \ i' = 7' AND o' 6 CEKT J'OST JAESS'} (4.26) 
CA! 6 Mtaicrl.post.mess') => o' € {MfJ(CA) n TM{crLpost'^^y„^hr„„^^)) (4.27) 
Ptp.Acrl-Vost',synckr^^s^ CA') = {[f, o'] | i' = 7' AND o' € CRLJ>OSTMESS') (4.28) 
SKCAre/, MISPC) = {{ORA.CA.CR' x CA.ORA.CP') u (4.29) 
(SELF.CR' X SELF.CP') U {RR' x RP') u {RENEWAL.CR' x RENEWAL.CP') U 
(7' X CERTJ'OSTMESS') U (7' x CRLJ'OSTJ^IESS')} 
SiiCArrf, MISPC) = {{ORA.CAJCR' x CA.ORA.CP') U {SELF.CR' x SELF.CP') u (4.30) 
{RR' X RP') u (RENEWAL.CR' x RENEW AL.CP')} 
Using Equation 4.30, the definition of the test suite to be instantiated can be further specified. For 
example, a test suite to be instantiated can include conditions on messages instantiated by the CAref-
Equations 4.31 and 4.32 demonstrate how a test stiite to be instantiated can be further expressed. 
Equation 4.31 expresses an instantiated test suite that includes test cases with input-output pairs 
where the input is correctly and incorrectly formatted with respect to the MISPC for all instantiated 
transactions. Similarly, Equation 4.32 expresses a instantiated test suite that includes test cases with 
input-output pairs where the input is not specified with respect to the MISPC. These two instJintiated 
test suites can be combined into one test suite as expressed in Equation 4.33. The instantiated test 
suite expressed in Equation 4.33 is the test suite to be implemented by this project. The details of the 
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instantiated test suite to be implemented by this project, including test data selection and evaluation 
of test cases, are presented in the next section. 
ISiiCAref, MISPC) = {[i',o'] I [i', o'] 6 S/(C>1„/, MISPC) AND (4.31) 
.invalidfoTmai{.M IS PC) AND 3i' .vaLidformat{M ISPC)} 
IS2{CAr,f, MISPC) = {[i', o'] I 3i' e nCAr^f) AND i' 0 («'), (4.32) 
Vt' 6 T{CAr^f,MISPC)} 
IS{CA„f, MISPC) ISiiC Are/, MISPC) U IS^iCAr^j, MISPC) (4.33) 
Test Suite Application Implementation and Execution Configuration 
The instantiation of the test suite, I S p ,  to be implemented by this projcct will focus on testing 
the certificate revocation transaction for the MISPC reference implementation of the CA component. 
Equation 4.34 shows the expression that can initially be used to describe the test suite. Equation 4.34 
is a modified version of Equation 3.16 where iin extra parameter has been introduced to describe the 
general test suite so that specific transactions to be tested can be expressed by the proposed framework. 
Using Equations 4.20 and 4.34, the expression of the test suite to be implemented can be simplified as 
shown in Equation 4.35 because the input-output pedr of the certificate revocation transaction is the only 
transaction to be tested. Using the notation to specify attributes about transaction messages, the test 
suite can be further enhanced as shown in Equation 4.36. Equation 4.36 shows that the test suite will 
contain test data where the revocation request message is an element from either a set of messages that 
have an incorrectly formatted header with the body formatted correctly; or a set of messages that have 
an incorrectly formatted body with the header formatted correctly; or a set of messages where both the 
header and body are correctly formatted. The test suite to be implemented will not test the validation 
of cryptographic functions such as signatxure validation. To express the testing of the cryptographic 
functions by the test suite, a modification to the sets expressed in Equation 4.36 would be required. 
For example, RR' invalidfoTmatJieadtr validformatJbodyVcdid„aiuc.protection{MISPC) would be the set 
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of messages that have an invalid header format, a validly formatted body, and a valid protection field 
value. 
ISj ,{CAref,  MISPC, cert.revocation') = {[i', o'] \ [i', o'] € Si{CAref,  MISPC) (4.34) 
AND i' € Ti^{certjrevocati(m')} 
ISp{CArefi  MISPC, cert.revocation') = RR' x RP" (4.35) 
ISp{CAref,  MISPC, ceTt.revocaticm') = 
{[rr',rp'] \ rr' € RB!.invalidformatJieader-ValidformatJbody{MISPC) OR (4.36) 
rv € RR -Valid format Jieader IS PC) OR 
rr' e RR'.validfor^ atiMISPC)} 
The elements of the sets described in Equation 4.36 are generated by the implemented test stiite 
based on specific input values to the test suite. The test suite reads an input file that contains a 
vector of values required to generate the specified segments of the PKI message. A sample of the 
contents of an input file is contained in Appendix A. The input file contains input values required 
to generate the fields of the header (hdr.version, hdr^nder, etc.), body (bdy.type, bdyjr-number, 
etc.), and protection (protection-signature, protection_gen_id, etc.) segments of a PKI message. Cur­
rently, if NULL is the input value for a field, the field is skipped when a value cannot be auto­
matically generated for it by the test suite. For example, the test suite will obtain the current 
time from the system clock for use in a time dependent field, if the field has a NULL as its input 
value. However, a X.500 distinguished name value that is NULL would result in the field not be­
ing assigned a value because the test suite does not have the capability to generate random X.500 
distinguished names. Based on the values present in the input file, the test suite automatically 
generates the sets for RR'. invalidformatJieader-VOlidfarmatJmdyiMISPC),  RR'.Validformat{MISPC),  
and RR'-validformatjieader invalidformatJiodviM IS PC)- For the sets RR'.validformat(MISPC) and 
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RR'. invalidformat Jteader • 'valid format J>ody{.f^ IS PC),  the test suitc will generate 2" - 1 permutations 
of the header formats for testing, where n is the number of header fields that can be filled in, given 
the input values. The adjustment of minus one is used to eliminate the header format that con­
tains no fields. In the input file of Appendix A, all 11 fields of the header can be filled, which 
results in 2'^ - 1 or 2047 header permutations being generated. Of the 2047 header format per­
mutations, 32 of the header formats are valid and 2015 of the header formats are invalid. Each 
header format is placed in a PKI message with a vahd body to be used as test data for the test 
suite. This results in 32 elements for the set RR'.validformat{MISPC) and 2015 elements for the set 
RR'. invalidformatJteader-volidformatJbodyiMISPC).  Similarly for the sets. RR'.validformat{MISPC) 
and RR'.valid formatJieader-invalid formatJ>ody{M IS PC), the test suite will generate 2" - 1 permuta­
tions of the revocation request body, where m is the number of revocatioa request body fields that 
can be filled in, given the values of the input file. Using the input file of Appendix A, all four fields 
of the revocation body request can be filled in resulting in 2'' — 1 or 15 permutations of the revoca­
tion request body formats being generated. Of the 15 revocation request body formats, 4 of the body 
formats are vzdid and 11 of the body formats are invahd according to the MISPC. Each revocation 
request format is placed in a PKI message with a vahd header to be used as test data for the test 
suite. This results in 4 elements for the set RR'.validformat(.MISPC) and 11 elements for the set 
RR .  Val id format Jieader-iTlVal idformatjbody ISPC).  
The test suite uses test data from the defined sets and presents the ASN.l DER encoding of each 
to the transaction processor of the MISPC CA reference implementation. If the transaction processor 
cannot process the test data, it retiims an implementation-specific error code and message. The error 
code and message are recorded by the test suite into a results fiile. Examples of the contents of a results 
file are contained in Appendix B and Appendix C. If the transaction processor can successfully process 
the test data, it returns an N'lISPC ASN.l OER encoded revocation response to the test data. If an 
MISPC revocation response is returned by the transaction processor, it is analyzed to determine if the 
format of the header and body of the response conform to the ^'IISPC. For example, the header must 
contain sender and recipient fields. In addition, the values of revocation response fields are inspected 
to verify that their contents are valid with respect to the MISPC, when possible. For example, the 
header version field should cont2Lin a value of zero. Finally, the values of the revocation response fields 
are compared to the revocation request fields where appropriate. For example, the sender field of the 
header for the revocation response should match the recipient field of the header for the revocation 
request. The results of the revocation response analysis are recorded in the results file. The results files 
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presented in Appendices B and C will be reviewed in detail in the next section of this chapter. 
The execution environment used by this project for the test suite appUcation requires two host 
systems as shown in Figure 4.4. Host Systemi is where the test suite application and the MISPC 
reference implementation of the CA component are hosted while Host System2 hosts a repository 
service application. This configuration could be simplified by running the repository service application 
on the Host Systemi or by eliminating the repository service application all together. The development 
contract for the components of the MISPC reference implementation specified that they would utilize 
Netscape's Directory Server version 1.03.^ The TransProc.exe module for the CA component of the 
MISPC reference implementation is to be tested for conformance to the MISPC by this project. The 
TransProc.exe module of the CA was chosen for testing because it allows the core MISPC functionality 
provided by the CA to be tested without overhead of testing the CA application's GUI for the CA 
operator. This is achieved by having the CA operator GUI and the core MISPC functionality in 
separate executable modules. The ORA/Client components of the MISPC reference implementation do 
not provide this advantage because their operator GUI and the core MISPC functionality are within 
the same executable module. To achieve the same level of test suite and subject apphcation interaction, 
the source code for the ORA/CA component would need to be modified. In addition, by testing the 
TransProc.exe module directly, the elimination of the e-mail server as part of the execution environment 
application is achieved which simplifies the design of the test suite application. 
Figure 4.5 shows the test suite related elements that are hosted on Host Systemi and which elements 
communicate with each other. The test suite application logs into the GCS module (gcs.dll) in order to 
access an existing cryptographic token containing a DSA private key for use by the instantiation of the 
TransProc.exe module that will be created by the test suite. When an instcintiation of the TransProc.exe 
'Attempts have been made to use version 1.1 of the reference implementation with later versions of the Netscape 
Directory Server, but they have not yielded successful results. 
Host Systemi 
TCP/IP 
netwofil 
Host SystemZ 
Figure 4.4 System Configuration for Execution of Test Suite. 
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Figure 4.5 Host System Config\iration for the Test Suite. 
modules is created, the test suite application presents and receives MISPC DER encoded PKI messages 
as test data to the module. After TransProc.exe has been tested, the test suite application destroys the 
instance of TransProc.exe it previously created. Figure 4.5 also shows that to eliminate the repository 
service application from the configuration would require that a new version of the sldap32.dll be created 
for the test suite to intercept repository queries by TransProc.exe. 
The test suite was implemented using the C/C++ programming languages. These programming 
languages were selected because the \IISPC reference implementation components were originally pro­
grammed with them. The object-oriented aspects of C++ are required for the test suite application to 
be able to interact with the TransProc.exe. The test suite application uses the OLE-COM interfaces 
defined by TransProc.exe to interact with it. As different versions of TransProc.exe are developed using 
the same OLE-COM interfaces, they can be tested without modification to the test suite appUcation. 
The development library used to implement the ASN.l defined data structures for the test suite appli­
cation also dictated the use of the C++ programming language. The BBN ASN.l compiler and library 
were used to synthesize the MISPC PKI data structures defined in ASN.l into C++ object classes. 
The BBN ASN.l library contained usefiil methods to manipulate the C++ objects, such as to DER 
encode and decode method for ASN.l objects. The final test suite application was compiled to target 
a personal computer running Windows 95 using version 5.01 of Borland's C/C++ compiler. The only 
DLL required by the test suite application is the GCS module, gcs.dll, which was not developed by this 
project but is required for testing TransProc.exe. 
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The test suite application and TransProc.exe were installed and run on a DELL personal computer 
with I6M of RAM, an Intel Pentium processor running at lOOMHz, and running Microsoft's Windows 
95. The repository was installed and run on a DELL personal computer with 128M of RAM, an 
Intel Pentium Pro running at 180MHz, and nmning Microsoft's Windows NT. Both host systems 
were networked using a TCP/IP Ethernet connection. Other important configuration variables for the 
test suite application eire given in Table 4.1. The existing cryptographic token used by the test suite 
application was generated by the gcs.dll before the test suite was executed. The next section will present 
details of the results of executing this test suite on the TransProc.exe module. 
Table 4.1 Configuration Variables Of The Test Suite Application. 
Configuration Variable Variable Setting 
Test Suite Host 129.6.52.15 
Test Suite Default Directory C.\PRCGRA*1\MISPC\CA 
GCS Token Default Directory C:\PROGRA-l\MISPC\CA\CCJ)B 
GCS Token Usemame ref.ca 
GCS Token Password trustme2 
LDAP Sever Host 129.6.52.23 
LDAP Port 389 
LDAP Username cn=Directory Manager, ou=nist, o=gov. c=US 
LDAP Password trustme2 
Results Analysis of the Test Suite Application's Execution 
The test suite described in the previous section was executed on the TransProc.exe module of the 
MISPC CA reference implementation. Using the input file of Appendix A, the test suite generated 
2057 individual test cases which were presented to the TransProc.exe module. The test suite could have 
generated 2062 individual test case; however, the TransProc.exe module was unable to handle five of 
the test cases. The five test cases that TVansProc.exe module could not handle related to the following 
variations of the header formats: 1) only the version field is present, 2) only the sender field is present, 
3) only the recipient field is present, 4) only the sender and recipient fields are present, and 5) only 
the version and recipient fields were present. The TransProc.exe module responded to these five test 
cases by causing a fatal system error that terminated the execution of the TransProc.exe module and 
the test suite. The time required by the test suite to execute the 2057 test cases was about 2.5 hours. 
The possibility of increasing the nimiber of test cases was explored by looking at creating permutations 
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of the CertDetails field of the revocation request body, but this was shown to be not practical for this 
project. The additional permutation would have increased the number of the test cases to 16384 for 
revocation request body. This would have resulted in a test suite execution time of about 22 hours, 
which was determined to be cxcessivc for this experiment. 
The number of elements in the sets RR'-invalid format Jieader-vO'lid format jiody{M IS PC), 
RR '.validformat{MISPC), and RR '.validformatJieader-invalidformatJ>ody{MISPC) Can be determined. 
The test suite generated 2011 elements for the set RR'.invalidformatJieader-validformatJiodyiMISPC), 
which composed 97.76% of the total test cases executed by the test suite. The test suite gener­
ated 12 elements for the set RR'-volidformatJieadtr-invididformatJ>ady{.MISPC), which was .58% of 
the total test cases executed by the test suite. The test suite generated 34 elements for the set 
RR'.validformat{MISPC), which was 1.65% of the total test cases executed by the test suite. This 
result is interesting because it demonstrates how limiting structured frameworks that only consider 
valid input spaces can be with regards to the generation of test cases. If only the valid input space were 
considered by the implemented test suite, only 34 test cases would have been developed. In addition, 
the five test cases that caused the fatal system error for the TVansProc.exe module would not have 
been generated, resulting in this error aot being revealed. This underscores how structured frame­
works limited to valid input spaces are not well suited for the development of test suites that intend to 
demonstrate an application's robustness. 
The results of executing the test cases for the set RR'.validformat(MISPC) generated by the test 
suite are given in Appendix B and Appendix C. The results in Appendix B were generated when 
the test suite was generating the permutations of the header formats. The results in Appendix C 
were generated when the test suite was generating the permutations of the revocation request body 
formats. The results of the test cases for the sets RRf•invalidformatJieader'VCilidformatJ>ody{MISPC) 
and RR'.valid format JieadtT-invalid format Jmdy(^M IS PC) are similar but were not included in this report 
because of the volume of the results. These results yielded some interesting information about the 
behavior of the TransProc.exe module. The implementation specific errors encountered by the test 
smte were numbered 6316, 4230, and 4245. Error 6316 indicates that the TransProc.exe module could 
not parse the DER encoded PKI message it received because it did not know where to place a particular 
field in its internal data structure. Error 4230 indicates that the TtansProc.exe module encountered 
an ASN.l tag which it did not recognize and therefore did not know where to place the information in 
its internal data structure. Error 4245 indicates that a null \-alue was found for a field that requires a 
value when the TransProc.exe module was parsing the DER encoded PKI message. Using the meanings 
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of these implementation specific errors and the results contained in Appendix B, the TransProc.exe 
module was shown not to be able to parse PKI messages that contained the FreeText field of the PKI 
message header even though this forms a valid MISPC PKI message format. Additionally, if the sender 
or recipient field of the header contained an e-mail address instead of a X.500 distinguished name, the 
test suite showed that the TransProc.exe module could not ptirse the PKI message header. The MISPC 
requires that any conforming MISPC component must be able to understand both X.500 distinguished 
names and e-mail addresses for the sender and recipient fields of the PKI message header. To verify 
that the TY-ansProc.cxe module was really having ASN.l parsing problems, a few of the PKI messages 
generated by the test suite that could not be parsed were inspected at the byte level to make sure the 
test suite was DER encoding the PKI messages correctly. These PKI messages were then compared 
to the messages being generated by the components of the MISPC reference implementation. In some 
prelimin2iry tests, it was shown that the components of the MISPC reference implementation were 
incorrectly generating DER encoded self registration request messages. In most cases, it was verified 
that the test suite was correctly DER encoding the PKI messages but the TransProc.exe module was 
unable to parse the message. Finally, the test suite revealed that the TreinsProc.exe module was not 
generating valid PKI message header formats for revocation responses when the header of a revocation 
request message conteiined a sender nonce. The MISPC requires that if a revocation request header 
contains a sender nonce, the revocation response header must contain that same nonce value in the 
recipient nonce field. This part of the MISPC is to protect PKI components from replay attacks using 
old transaction messages. The results contained in Appendix C show that the TransProc.exe module 
appears to be processing the permutations of revocation request bodies correctly and generating valid 
revocation response messages. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Conclusions 
The proposed structiired fraaaework for test suite development was initially introduced by this thesis 
to address some of the weaknesses found in the TTF structured framework for test suite development. 
Test case generation based on a specification's invalid input space is not being performed by the TTF 
structured framework. The TTF structtired framework begins by defining the valid input space and 
acknowledging the existence of an invalid input space. However, the TTF structured framework focuses 
on manipulation of the valid input space by partition testing techniques and uses the results to generate 
test cases for a test suite. By not considering the invalid input space, the TTF structured framework 
cannot be used effectively in the development of test siiites that desire to determine an application's 
robustness. This thesis showed that over 90% of the test cases used by the test suite were considered 
by the MISPC to be invalid. This result underscores how important it is for structured frameworks to 
use both valid and invalid input spaces when generating test cases so that the framework will be useful 
in the development of test suites with various objectives. 
Another weakness of the TTF structured framework is its acknowledged inability to express in­
teractions between applications. The ability to express interactions between applications has become 
more important as applications are being designed as a single application that interacts with multiple 
modules and the nimiber of client-server applications increases. A structiired framework for test suite 
development that can capture interactions between applications can develop relationships between the 
applications that are important in the design of a test suite. The proposed framework addresses this 
weakness by expressing interactions (or transactions) between applications as a set of messages. The 
messages are organized as input-output pairs with the use of the processing and generating operations 
which allow relationships between applications to be expressed. The relationships between applications 
help in the development and implementation of test suites. For example, in this thesis understanding 
that MISPC ORA and CH components can both request certificates to be revoked, gives insight to 
the test suite designer that the MISPC CA component must be able to process certificate revocation 
77 
requests from both ORA find CH components. 
Finally, an unexpected result of this thesis is the idea of expressing a test suite on two levels, 
abstractly eind concretely (an instantiation). The abstract test suite is created based on theoretical 
notions about how a test suite should be described and is developed using abstract methodologies. 
The instantiation of a test suite is created based on real-world issues, taking into account the specific 
application to be tested while the development and implementation of a test suite is being done. The 
proposed structured framework recognizes the benefits of each view and tries to provide a structured 
framework under which both can be unified. Thus, the proposed structured framework introduces a 
method to describe an abstract test suite which can then be used to create an instantiation of the original 
abstract test suite. In short, the proposed structured framework enhances structured frameworks for 
test suite development by using both valid and invalid input spaces for test data generation, is able to 
express interactions between applications, and provides a unifying framework under which both abstract 
test suites and instantiations of test suites can be developed. 
Future Work 
The proposed structured framework for test suite development introduced in this thesis offers several 
opportunities for further research. The continued development and extension of the proposed structured 
framework provides one eirea for further research. Investigating and developing a method for expressing 
an application's state is not currently addressed by the proposed structured framework. A starting point 
may be to concatenate input-output pairs to develop sequences of test data which might be used to 
represent the state of the application under test. The development of a statistical method for sampling 
test data that is generated by the proposed framework would help when the set of test data generated 
becomes very large. The statistical method should maximize the effectiveness of the test suite when using 
a limited number of test data. The continued application of the proposed structured framework to other 
specifications and applications will help in furthering the development of the structured framework and 
extending its capabilities. One opportimity would be to apply the structured framework to the FIPS-
140-1 Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules standard and its Derived Test Requirements 
(DTRs), which describe the requirements for a cryptographic module to become validated. The DTRs 
could be expressed elegantly with the proposed structured framework because of its set nature which is 
similar to that of the DTRs. Finally, the test suite for the MISPC reference implementation that was 
developed and implemented in this thesis could be made more complete, which also would continue to 
help the development and extension of the structured framework. 
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APPENDIX A EXAMPLE INPUT FILE OF THE TEST SUITE 
APPLICATION 
hdr.version—0 
hdr^nder=c=US@o=gov<§ou=iust<§lcn=nelson bastings 
hcir-sender.type=DniNAME 
hdrJssuer=c=US@o=gov@ou=nist@cn=ref ca 
hdr-type=DIIlNA\'IE 
hdrjncssageTime=NULL 
hdr.protection=id.dsa.with.stial 
hdrjcnderKn)=232abd 
hdrj:ecipKID=332312 
hdr.transactionID=1234567 
hdrjsenderNonce=23233 
hdr jrecipN once=:34324 
hdr^eeText=For User Consuption.... 
hdr^eeTextType=IA5STIlIN G 
bdy.type=RR 
bdyjT_nuinber= 1 
bdyjrr-ct-version=2 
bdy JT-ct-serialNumber= 121289 
bdy-TT-ct jigningAIgID=id.dsa_with_sbal 
bdy jr-ctJubject=c=US@o=gov@ou=nist@cn=nelson bastings 
bdyjnr-ct-validity_notBefore=NULL 
bdy_rr-ct-validityjiotAfter=NULL 
bdy jr_ct Jssuer=c=US@o=gov@ou=nist@cn=ref ca 
bdyjT.ct_pubK^InfoJd=id-dsa.witli_shal 
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bdyjn:.ct.pubKeyInfo.dsa-parameter.p=ecla364759a3e339d6dcf2d710c96a968fcfl4bece314f3 
6045f95ba55c8bc256d93b3d0971d2b3523944c72313 
142e39b80c9bbb332dc5884f3f2c8Gl846ad3 
bdyj:r.ct.pubKeyIiifo.dsa-parameter.q=87bf6ee5868ef6314ee8da2cbda6cd72f5002045 
bdyjT-Ct-pubKeyInfo.dsa-parameter^=6e3ba6373fd92fl95b40e6f45b8bed03726cceal872f5 
blf3e97db76fbc60cd769el0ae016d4b433c7cb3de4 
b863357a63eeb3f90455930ae89bfe088aeeb82f 
bdyjT.ct.pubKeyInfo.dsa.parameterjeed=42806313e0226d9f7d489c7edeleacd3ed95fbd4 
bdyjT.ct.pubKeyInfoJcey=NULL 
bdy jT.ct JssuertriD=894823423 
bdyjT.ct subject UID=3312223 
bdyjT.ct-number.ex=2 
bdyjr.ct.exJd=id.ce^ubjectKeyIdentifier 
bdyjr.ct.ex-value=43423423 
bdyjT.ct.ex.critical=TRUE 
bdyjr.ct.exJd=id.ce.authorityKeyId 
bdyjT.ct.ex-value=48929304 
bdy-rr.ct.ex-critical=FALSE 
bdy-rrj'eason=434324 
bdyjT.badSince=NULL 
bdyj:rjiimiber-ex=2 
bdyjT.exJd=id-ce^ubjectKeyIdentifier 
bdyjr.ex_value=43423423 
bdy_rr.ex.critical=TRUE 
bdyjr.exJd=id-ce^uthorityKeyIdentdfier 
bdyjr.ex.value=48929304 
bdy_rr.ex_critical=FALSE 
protectioii_sigature=NULL 
protectioii-genJd=id_dsa_witlushal 
protection_parameter.dsa-p=ecla364759a3e339d6dcf2d710c96a968fcfl4bece314f3 
6045£95ba55c8bc256d93b3d0971d2b3523944c72313 
142e39b80c9bbb332dc5884f3Ec8el846ad3 
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protectioii-parameter.dsa.q=87bf6ec5868ef6314ee8da2cbda6cd72f5002045 
protection.parameter-dsa.g=6e3ba6373fd92fl95b40e6f45b8bed03726cceal872f5 
blf3e97db76fbc60cd769el0ae016d4b433e7cb3de4 
b863357a63eeb3f90455930ae89bfe088aeeb82f 
protection.paraineter.dsajeed=:42806313e0226d9f7d489c7edeleacd3ed95fbd4 
protection-dsa-key=NULL 
protection-desjnacJcey=8980989 
81 
APPENDIX B RESULTS FILE FOR THE CERTIFICATE 
REVOCATION TRANSACTION: VALID HEADER FORMATS 
Header Testcase:: 2047 
Error :: NONE 
Header Format :: VERSION,SENDER,RECIPIENT,MESSAGE.TIME.ALGORITHMID, 
SUBJECT JCEYJD,RECIPIENT_KEYJD,TRANSACTIONJD, 
SU'BJECT-NONCE,RECIPIENT jyONCE,FREE-TEXT 
Result 2047 
Error :: 6316 
Error Message :: The CA could not parse the request: general transaction processor error 
Header Testcase:: 2015 
Error :: NONE 
Header Format :: VERSION,SENDER,RECIPIENT,MESSAGE.TIME,ALGORITHM ID, 
NTJLL,RECIPIENT_KEYJD,TRANSACTIONJD,SUBJECTJ^ONCE, 
RECIPIENT JSrONCEJ-REE-TEXT 
Result :: 2015 
Error:: 6316 
Error Message :: The CA could not parse the request; general transaction processor error 
Header Testcase:: 1983 
Error:: NONE 
Header Format :: VERSION,SENDER,RECIPIENT,MESSAGE-TI]VIE,ALGORITHMID, 
SUBJECT JKEYJD,NULL,TRANSACTIONJD,SUBJECT3rONCE, 
RECIPIENT-NONCE^TIEE-TEXT 
Result :: 1983 
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Error:: 6316 
Error Message :: The CA could not parse the request: general transaction processor error 
Header Testcase:: 1951 
Error:: NONE 
Header Format :: VERSION,SENDER,RECIPIENT,-VEESSAGE.TIME.ALGORITHM ID, 
NULL.NULL,TRANSACTIONJD,SUBJECT-NONCE, 
RECIPIENT_NONCE.FREE-TEXT 
Result :: 1951 
Error:: 6316 
Error Message :: The CA could not parse the request: general transaction processor error 
Header Testcase:: 1791 
Error:: NONE 
Header Format :: VERSION,SENDER,RECIPIENT,MESSAGE-TIME,ALGORITHM ED, 
SUB JECT-KEYJD,RECIPIENT JCEYJD,TRANSACTIONJD,mJLL, 
RECIPIENT_NONCE.FREE-TEXT 
Result1791 
Error :: 6316 
Error Message :: The CA could not parse the request: general transaction processor error 
Header Testcase:: 1759 
Error:: NONE 
Header Format :: VERSION,SENDER,RECIPIENT,MESSAGE_TIME,ALGORITHM ID, 
NULL,RECIPIENT_[CEYJD,TRANSACTIONJD,NLT.L. 
RECIPIENT_NONCE,FREE-TEXT 
Result:: 1759 
Error:: 6316 
Error Message :: The CA could not parse the request: general transaction processor error 
Header Testcase:: 1727 
Error:: NONE 
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Header Format :: VERSION,SENDER,RECIPIENT,MESSAGE.TIME,ALGORITHM ED, 
SUBJECTJCEYJD,NULL,TRANSACTIONJD,NX;LL, 
RECrPIENT_NONCE,FREE.TEXT 
Result :: 1727 
Error :: 6316 
Error Message :: The CA could not parse the request: general transaction processor error 
Header Testcase:: 1695 
Error :: NONE 
Header Format :: VERSION,SENDER,RECIPIENT,MESSAGE.TIME,ALGORITHM ID, 
NULL,NULL.TRANSACTIONJD,NtrLL, 
RECIPIENT J^ONCE,FREE.TEXT 
Result :: 1695 
Error :: 6316 
Error Message :: The CA could not parse the request: general transaction processor error 
Header Testcase:: 1535 
Error ::  NONE 
Header Format :: VERSION,SENDER,RECIPIENT.MESSAGE.TIME,ALGORITHM ID, 
SUB JECTJCEYJD,RECIPIENT JCEYJD,TRANSACTIONJD, 
SL^JECTJ^ONCE,NULL,FREE-TEXT 
Result :: 1535 
Error :: 6316 
Error Message :: The CA cojild not parse the request: general transaction processor error 
Header Testcase:: 1503 
Error :: NONE 
Header Format :: VERSION,SEN*DER,RECIPIENT,MESSAGE-TIME,ALGORITHM ID, 
N-ULL,RECIPIENT_KEYJD,TRANSACTIONJD,SL^JECT-NONCE, 
NTJLLJFREE-TEXT 
Result :: 1503 
Error :: 6316 
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Error Message :: The CA could not parse the request: general transaction processor error 
Header Testcase:: 1471 
Error :: NONE 
Header Format :: VERSION,SENDER,RECIPIENT,MESSAGE.TIME,ALGORITHM ID, 
SL^JECT_KEYJD,NLTX,TRANSACTIONJD,SL^JECTJVONCE, 
NULL,FREE.TEXT 
Result :: 1471 
Error :: 6316 
Error Message :: The CA could not parse the request: general transaction processor error 
Header Testcase:: 1439 
Error :: NONE 
Header Format :: VERSION,SENDER,RECIPIENT,MESSAGE-TIME,ALGORITHM ID, 
NL'LL,NXJLL.TRANSACTIONJD,SUBJECT-NONCE, 
NULL,FREE.TEXT 
Result :: 1439 
Error :: 6316 
Error Message :: The CA could not parse the request: general transaction processor error 
Header Testcase:: 1279 
Error :: NONE 
Header Format :: VERSION.SENDER,RECIPIENT>IESSAGE.TIME,ALGORITHM ID, 
SUBJECT-KEY JD,RECIPIENT-KEYJD,TRANSACTIONJD,NXj'LL, 
NULL,FREE_TEXT 
Result :: 1279 
Error :: 6316 
Error Message :: The CA could not parse the request: general transaction processor error 
Header Testcase:: 1247 
Error:: NONE 
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Header Format :: VERSION,SENDER,RECIPIENT,MESSAGE.TIME,ALGORITHM ID, 
NULL,RECIPIENT-KEY JD,TRANSACTIONJD,NLTL, 
NULL,FREE-TEXT 
Result :: 1247 
Error :: 6316 
Error Message :: The CA could not parse the request: general transaction processor error 
Header Testcase:: 1215 
Error :: NONE 
Header Format :: VERSION,SENDER,RECIPIENT,MESSAGE-TIME,ALGORITHM ID, 
SUBJECT-KEY JD,NULL,TRANSACTION-ID,NLT.L. 
NULL,FREE.TEXT 
Result :: 1215 
Error :: 6316 
Error Message :: The CA could not parse the request: general transaction processor error 
Header Testcase:: 1183 
Error :: NONE 
Header Format :: VERSION,SENDER,RECIPIENT,MESSAGE.TIME,ALGORITHM ID, 
NULL,NULL,TRANSACTION-ID,NULL, 
NULL,FREE.TEXT 
Result :: 1183 
Error :: 6316 
Error Message :: The CA could not parse the request: general transaction processor error 
Header Testcase:: 1023 
Error:: NONE 
Header Format :: VERSION,SENDER,RECIPIENT,MESSAGE-TIME.ALGORITHM HD, 
SUBJECT_KEYJD,RECIPIENT-KEYJD,TRANSACTIONJD, 
SUBJECT-NONCE,RECIPIENT_NONCE,NULL 
Header Analysis Result :: 1023 
Error:: WRONG-DYNAMIC.CONTENT 
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Field :: RECIPIENTJ>fONCE 
RP Body Analysis Result :: 1023 
Error :: NONE 
Field :: N/A 
Header Testcase:: 991 
Error :: NONE 
Header Format :: VERSION,SENDER,RECIPIENT.IVIESSAGE.TIME,ALGORITHM ID. 
NULL,RECIPIENT-KEY JD,TRANSACTIONJD, 
SUBJECT J^ONCE,RECIPIENTJVONCE,NULL 
Header Analysis Result :: 991 
Error:: WRONG JDYNA^HC-CONTENT 
Field :: RECIPIENT_NONCE 
RP Body Analysis Result :: 991 
Error :: NONE 
Field :: N/A 
Header Testcase:: 959 
Error:: NONE 
Header Format :: VERSION,SENDER,RECIPIENT,MESSAGE.TIME,ALGORITHM ED, 
SUBJECT JKEY-ID,N'ULL,TRANSACTIONJD,SUBJECTJS'ONCE. 
RECIPIENT_NONCE,NULL 
Header Analysis Result :: 959 
ErrorWRONGJDYNAMIC-CONTENT 
Field :: RECIPEENT_NONCE 
RP Body Analysis Result :: 959 
Error:: NONE 
Field :: N/A 
Header Testcase:: 927 
Error:: NONE 
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Header Format:: VERSION,SENDER,RECIPIENT,MESSAGE-TIME,ALGORITHM ID, 
NULL,NULL,TRANSACTIONJD,SUB JECT.NONCE, 
RECIPIENT-NONCE,NULL 
Header Analysis Result :: 927 
Error :: WRONGJDYNAMIC-CONTENT 
Field :: RECIPIENT-NONCE 
RP Body Analysis Result :: 927 
Error:: NONE 
Field :: N/A 
Header Testcase;: 767 
Error :: NONE 
Header Format:: VERSION,SENDER,RECIPIENT,MESSAGE-TIME,ALGORITHl^I H), 
SUBJECT_KEY.rD,RECIPrENT.KEYJD,TRANSACTION-ID,NULL, 
RECIPIENT-NONCEJWLL 
Header Analysis Result :: 767 
Error :: NONE 
Field :: N/A 
RP Body Analysis Result :: 767 
Error :: NONE 
F i e l d  : :  N / A  
Header Testcase:: 735 
Error :: NONE 
Header Format :: VERSION,SENDER,RECIPIENT,MESSAGE-TIME,ALGORITHM ID, 
NULL,RECIPIENT-KEY-ID,TRANSACTIONJD, 
N-ULL.RECIPIENTJSrONCE,NXnX 
Header Analysis Result :: 735 
ErrorNONE 
Field :: N/A 
RP Body Analysis Result :: 735 
Error :; NONE 
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Field :: N/A 
Header Testcase:: 703 
Error :: NONE 
Header Format :: VERSION,SENDER^RECIPIENT,MESSAGE-TIME,ALGORITHM ID, 
SUBJECT JKEYJD,NULL,TIlANSACTIONJD,NULL, 
RECIPIENT-NONCE,NXJLL 
Header Analysis Result :: 703 
Error :: NONE 
Field :: N/A 
RP Body Analysis Result :: 703 
Error :: NONE 
Field :: N/A 
Header Testcase:: 671 
Error :: NONE 
Header Format :: VERSION.SENDER,RECIPIENT,MESSAGE.TIME,ALGORITHiVI ID, 
NULL,NULL,TRANSACTIONJD,NULL, 
RECIPIENT_NONCE,NULL 
Header Analysis Result :: 671 
Error :: NONE 
Field :: N/A 
RP Body Analysis Result :: 671 
Error :: NONE 
Field :: N/A 
Header Testcase:: 511 
Error:: NONE 
Header Format :: VERSION,SENDER,RECIPIENT,MESSAGE.TIME,ALGORITHM ID, 
SUBJECT-KEY JD3ECrPIENTJCEyjD,TRANSACTIONJD, 
SUBJECT_NONCE,NULL,NULL 
Header Analysis Resiilt :: 511 
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Error :: WRONGJDYNAMIC.CONTENT 
Field :: RECIPIENT-NONCE 
RP Body Ansilysis Resiilt :: 511 
Error :: NONE 
Field :: N/A 
Header Testcase:: 479 
Error :: NONE 
Header Format :: VERSION,SENDER,RECIPIENT,MESSAGE.TIME,ALGORITHM ID, 
NULL,RECIPIENTJCEYJD,TRANSACTIONJD,SUBJECT_NONCE, 
NXn.L,NULL 
Header Analysis Result :: 479 
Error :: WRONG-DYNAMIC-CONTENT 
Field :: RECIPIENT-NONCE 
RP Body Analysis Result :: 479 
Error :: NONE 
Field :: N/A 
Header Testcase:: 447 
Error :: NONE 
Header Format :: VERSION,SENDER,RECIPIENT,MESSAGE_TIME,ALGORITHM ID. 
SUB JECT-KEY.ID,Nin.L,TRANSACTIONJD,SUBJECT-NONCE, 
NULL,NULL 
Header Analysis Result :: 447 
Error :: WRONG-DYNAMIC-CONTENT 
Field :: RECIPIENTJMONCE 
RP Body Analysis Result :: 447 
Error :: NONE 
Field :: N/A 
Header Testcase:: 415 
Error :: NONE 
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Header Format :: VERSION,SENDER,RECIPIENT,MESSAGE.TIME,ALGORITHM ID, 
NULL,NXn.L,TRANSACTIONJD,SUBJECTJIONCE, 
NULL,NULL 
Header Analysis Rcsiilt :: 415 
Error:: WRONG-DYNAMIC-CONTENT 
Field :: RECIPIENTJ^ONCE 
RP Body Analysis Result :: 415 
Error :: NONE 
Field :: N/A 
Header Testcase:; 255 
Error:: NONE 
Header Format :: VERSION,SENDER.RECIPIENT.MESSAGE.TIME,ALGORITHM ID, 
SUBJECT-KEY JD,RECIPIENT_KEYJD,TRANSACTION-ID .NULL, 
NULL,NULL 
Header Analysis Result :: 255 
Error:: NONE 
Field :: N/A 
RP Body Analysis Result :: 255 
Error:: NONE 
Field :: N/A 
Header Testcase:; 223 
Error:: NONE 
Header Format :: VERSION,SENDER,RECIPIENT>IESSAGE-TIME,ALGORITHM ID, 
NULL,RECIPIENT-KEYJD,TRANSACTION-ID,N-ULL, 
NLTJL,NULL 
Header Analysis Result :: 223 
Error:: NONE 
Field :: N/A 
RP Body Analysis Result :: 223 
Error:: NONE 
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Field :: N/A 
Header Testcase:: 191 
Error:: NONE 
Header Format :: VERSION,SENDER,HECIPIENT,MESSAGE-TIME,ALGORITHM ID, 
SUBJECT-KEY JD,NULL,TRANSACTIONJD,NULL, 
NULL.NXn.L 
Header Analysis Result :: 191 
Error:: NON'E 
Field :: N/A 
RP Body Analysis Result :: 191 
Error :: NONE 
Field :: N/A 
Header Testcase:: 159 
Error :: NONE 
Header Format :: VERSION,SENDER,RECIPIENT.MESSAGE-TIME,ALGORITHM ID, 
NULL.NULL,TRANSACTION.ID,NULL, 
NULL,NULL 
Header Analysis Result :: 159 
Error :: NONE 
Field ;: N/A 
RP Body Aneilysis Result :: 159 
Error:: NONE 
Field :: N/A 
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APPENDIX C RESULTS FILE FOR THE CERTIFICATE 
REVOCATION TRANSACTION: ALL BODY FORMATS 
Revocation Request Testcase :: 15 
Error :: NONE 
Revocation Request Format :: CERT-TEMPLATE,REASON.CODE,BAD-SINCE_DATE, 
crl-extensions 
Header Analysis Result :: 15 
Error :: NONE 
Field :: N/A 
RP Body Analysis Result 15 
Error :: NONE 
Field :: N/A 
Revocation Request Testcase :: 14 
Error :: \nSSING J'lELD 
Revocation Request Format:: NXJLL,REASON_CODE,BAD^INCE_DATE, 
CRLJEXTENSIONS 
Result :: 14 
Error :: 6316 
Error Message :: The CA could not parse the request: general transaction processor error 
Revocation Request Testcase :: 13 
Error :: MISSINGJFIELD 
Revocation Request Format :: CERT-TEMPLATE,NULL,BADjSINCE_DATE, 
crl-extensions 
Result :: 13 
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Error :: 6316 
Error Message :: The CA could not parse the request: general transaction processor error 
Revocation Request Testcase :: 12 
Error :: NOSSINGJFIELD 
Revocation Request Format :: NULL.NULL,BAD-SINCE_DATE,CRL-EXTENSIONS 
Result :: 12 
Error :: 6316 
Error Message :: The CA could not parse the request: general transaction p: jcessor error 
Revocation Request Testcase :: 11 
Error :: NONE 
Revocation Request Format :: CERT.TEMPLATE,REASON.CODE.NULL, 
CRL_EXTENSIONS 
Header Anedysis Result :: 11 
Error :: NONE 
Field :: N/A 
RP Body Analysis Result :: 11 
Error :: NONE 
Field N/A 
Revocation Request Testcase :: 10 
Error :; MISSING-FIELD 
Revocation Request Format :: NULL,REASON_CODE,NULL,CRL_EXTENSIONS 
Result:: 10 
Error :: 6316 
Error Message :: The CA could not parse the request: general transaction processor error 
Revocation Request Testcase :: 9 
Error :: MISSING-FIELD 
Revocation Request Format :: CERT.TEMPLATE,NULL,NULL,CRLJEXTENSIONS 
Result:: 9 
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Error:: 6316 
Error Message :: The CA could not parse the request: general transaction processor error 
Revocation Request Testcase :: 8 
Error :: MISSING-FIELD 
Revocation Request Format :: NULL,NULL,NULL,CRL_EXTENSIONS 
Result 8 
Error :: 6316 
Error Message :: The CA could not parse the request: general transaction processor error 
Revocation Request Testcase :: 7 
Error:: MISSING-FIELD 
Revocation Request Format :: CERT-TEMPLATE,REASON.CODE,BAD-SINCEJDATE, 
NULL 
Header Analysis Result :: 7 
Error:: NONE 
Field :: N/A 
RP Body Aneilysis Result :: 7 
Error :: NONE 
Field :: N/A 
Revocation Request Testcase :: 6 
Error:: MISSING.FIELD 
Revocation Request Format :: NULL,REASON-CODE,BAD-SINCE-DATE,NLT.L 
Result :: 6 
Error6316 
Error Message :: The CA could not parse the request: general transaction processor error 
Revocation Request Testcase :: 5 
Error:: MISSING-FIELD 
Revocation Request Format :: CEKr_TEMPLATE,NULL3AD.SINCE_DATE,NULL 
Residt :: 5 
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Error :: 6316 
Error Message :: The CA could not parse the request: general transaction processor error 
Revocation Request Testcase :: 4 
Error :: MISSING JIELD 
Revocation Request Format :: NULL,NULL,BAD.SINCEJDATE,NULL 
Result :: 4 
Error :: 6316 
Error Message :: The CA could not parse the request: general transaction processor error 
Revocation Request Testcase :: 3 
Error :: MISSING_FIELD 
Revocation Request Format :: CERT.TEN'IPLATE.REASON.CODE,NULL,NULL 
Header Analysis Result :: 3 
Error :: NONE 
Field : :  N/A 
RP Body Analysis Result 3 
Error :: NONE 
Field : :  N/A 
Revocation Request Testcase :: 2 
Error :: mSSING JIELD 
Revocation Request Format :: NULL,REASON-CODE,NULL,NULL 
Result :: 2 
Error:: 6316 
Error Message :: The CA could not parse the request: general transaction processor error 
Revocation Request Testcase :: 1 
Error:: MISSING JTELD 
Revocation Request Format :: CERT-TEMPLATE,NULL,NULL,NULL 
Result :: 1 
Error :: 4245 
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Error Message :: The CA could not parse the request: general input error 
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